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Stentiford, Barry M., M.A., August 1995 History
Evolution of an Idea: Adaption of the Militia from the Peace 
of Paris to the Great War
Director: Associate Professor Michael S. Mayer
At the end of the War of Independence, Americans found 
themselves with a need for a military force in the Northwest 
Territory. The government under the Articles of Confederation possessed no authority to create a full-time army. After the new Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation, a solution to the problem of national defense 
emerged. That solution, which included a small regular army 
which could be augmented by state militia, served with little modification until the early twentieth century, when a crisis on a border exposed the drawbacks of the system. 
This study examines the process through which the old Revolutionary idea of a strong state-based militia as the 
main instrument of national defense was slowly replaced by a mostly federally controlled National Guard as a second line 
of defense.The first part of this study is based on the writings of those most influential in creating the constitutional basis 
for the old Regular Army and militia. Later chapters rely on the writings of those involved in the Preparedness debate of the early twentieth century. The experience of the Regular Army and the National Guard in response to Pancho Villa's 
raids on the Mexican border are explored as the catalyst for change just prior to the Great War. The Militia Acts of 1792, 1903, and 1908, several Volunteer Acts, as well as the 
National Defense Act of 1916, provide the basic focus.
The military needs of the Northwest Territory in the 1780s 
and the Mexican border area in 1916 exposed the weaknesses of the militia system. Both times, America responded by 
strengthening federal control of military force at the 
expense of the states. Change came only when real, rather 
than hypothetical, challenges could not be met under the existing structure.
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Introduction
America has two distinct military institutions— the 
Regular Army and the militia. Both institutions had a history 
in England that began long before the establishment of British 
colonies on the east coast of North America- Shortly after 
settlement in the New World, the English in Massachusetts Bay 
Colony established a colonial militia for their protection. 
Interest in the colonial militia rose and fell with the threat 
from Indians and French. The institution, however, continued 
throughout the colonial period. The colonial militia remained 
a locally-based military force for the protection of the town, 
or for use by the colonial government. Although the militia 
aided the British army in the mid-eighteenth century, the 
militia in both England and America remained distinct from the 
army. After independence from Britain, America began a slow 
process that eventually wrought a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the militia and the army.
The relationship between state militia and the federal 
government underwent two periods of transformation between the 
end of the War of Independence and the beginning of the Great 
War- The first change came with the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1789 and the passage of the Militia Act of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1792, which established a full-time regular army plus a state- 
based militia for national defense and local security. The 
system created in those early years served the Republic 
through the nineteenth century.
In the early twentieth century, the Militia Act of 1903 
began the process of integrating the National Guard more fully 
into the defense structure. However, traditional fears of a 
federal monopoly on military force prevented a practical 
integration of the National Guard with the Regular Army. 
Events on the Mexican border and in northern Mexico following 
the Mexican Revolution exposed weaknesses in the American 
defense structure. With a major European war threatening to 
involve the United States, military operations on the Mexican 
border fully taxed the American military establishment. As a 
consequence. Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916, 
partially to integrate further the National Guard and Regular 
Army. The Great War in Europe threatened to entangle the 
United States; however, it took the actual experience in 
Mexico to bring about concrete changes in the relationship 
between the Regular Army and the National Guard.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I. The Old Northwest and the Constitution
Between the Peace of Paris at the end of the 
Revolutionary War, and the adoption of the Constitution in 
1789, state militia provided the new nation with its only 
substantial military force.' In part, this desire to disband 
the Continental Army resulted from the Englishmen's 
traditional fear of a standing army, combined with the belief 
that the new nation had no need to keep a standing army. 
Opposition to the proposed Society of Cincinnati, consisting 
of former Continental Army officers, reflected public 
antipathy to any organization of regulars after the end of 
hostilities.^ With the adoption of the new Constitution in 
1789, the federal government received specific permission to 
create a federal standing army not dependent on the states for 
recruiting or equipping. The eight years between the end of 
the War of Independence and the drafting of the new 
Constitution combined with experiences from the war to sway
‘Richard H. Kohn, Eaale and Sword: The Federalists and 
the Creation of the Militarv Establishment in America (New 
York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 45. Kohn estimates that the states had a total of 400,000 men enrolled in the militia.
^James K. Martin, and Mark E. Lender, A Respectable Armv: 
The Militarv Origins of the Republic. 1763-1789 (Arlington 
Heights, II: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982), pp. 202-203.
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the balance in favor of a standing army. By 1787, enough of 
the framers of the new Constitution believed that if the 
government and nation were to survive internal revolts and to 
secure the frontier, then the government needed something more 
professional and reliable than militia.
The Articles of Confederation, from 1 March 1781 until 
the Constitution went into effect on 4 March 1789, required 
that each state "...always keep up a well-regulated and 
disciplined militia.. along with the stores needed to supply 
i t T h e  Articles also provided for a war-time national army. 
This was not to be a standing regular army but one dependent 
on the states. Article VII provided that the state 
legislatures would raise the land forces for common defense, 
with the state legislatures commissioning all officers below 
the rank of general, and that the home state's legislature 
kept the sole authority to fill any vacancies that occurred in 
the officer corps during the period its forces were engaged in 
the common defense. The fifth paragraph of Article IX 
explained the method for apportioning the burden of providing 
individual soldiers among the states.'*
The government under the Articles of Confederation 
clearly received the authority to gather an army from state 
regiments, as well as the responsibility to pay it. However, 
the national government lacked a reliable method of raising
^Articles of Confederation, Article VI, Paragraph 4. 
^Ibid., Article IX, Paragraph 5.
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money to pay for an army, and the states actually received the 
responsibility to form and equip the regiments. After the 
states raised, equipped, and trained their quota of regiments, 
the federal government would muster the regiments into federal 
service. These state-raised regiments together formed the 
national army; no regular units existed. This system resembled 
more the method used in North America during the French and 
Indian Wars, where colonial governments organized and equipped 
militia, which then served under British generals, than a true 
federal army.® With regiments in federal service organized by 
their home states, and with all officers below the rank of 
general commissioned by their state governments, the state 
governments would continue to have a strong influence in the 
national army thus created. The difference between the 
confederal concept of the national army and the system 
employed by Britain during the colonial period was that the 
colonial militia had a regular British army to augment, 
whereas none existed under the Articles.® During the 
Revolutionary War, the militia augmented the professional 
Continental Army, but the Articles did not provide for the 
retention or recreation of the Continental Army after the war.
®Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Armv (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 17.
®In the nineteenth century, the United States would return to a system closely resembling that of the colonial 
period. In the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish Wars, as well as 
many Indian wars, the locally raised U.S. Volunteers augmented 
the small Regular Army for the duration of the conflicts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In the concept outlined in the Articles, a "federal" army 
existed only when called into service for war, revolt, or 
other emergency. Most likely, the bulk of men and officers 
raised by the states for their quotas would come from the 
militia.
The system envisioned by the framers of the Articles 
lacked the ability to sustain a prolonged military presence on 
the frontier. With the British army due to evacuate the old 
Northwest, the newly independent United States had no national 
forces with which to fill the vacuum. George Washington and 
other nationalists feared that the Indians would either 
dismantle or burn the forts in the Northwest when the British 
evacuated them under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.^
The part time nature of state militia rendered them ill- 
suited for the mission. Militiamen with families and farms or 
businesses could not be expected to remain at frontier posts 
for more than a few months, and the constant rotation would 
burden both the commanders of the forts by constantly changing 
their soldiers and the militia system itself. The framers of 
the Articles of Confederation drafted their plan of government 
during the war with Great Britain. They planned a military 
system to defend the nation against a more conventional
^John Fitzpatrick, ed. , Writings of Georae Washington 
from the original Manuscript sources. 1745-1799 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), P. 26:398- 
400. In a letter of 3 May 1783 to the President of the 
Continental Congress, Washington expressed his urgent desire 
to occupy the forts as soon as the British evacuated them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
adversary— similar to Great Britain. However, the early years 
of independence presented a very different problem— a 
seemingly endless struggle with the Indians on the frontier.
Not all leaders in the days after York town saw a national 
army as something to be avoided. Many of the leaders of the 
military effort against Great Britain realized that without a 
professional force developed in peacetime, the security of the 
Republic remained in jeopardy.* But these men also realized 
that "they were caught in an uncomfortable dilemma....[T]he 
standing army was politically unfeasible...yet some regular 
establishment was imperative because the militia was 
unquestionably unsound militarily."® Accordingly, men such as 
Secretary of War Henry Knox, future Secretary of War Timothy 
Pickering, and drill master of the Continental Army Frederick 
von Steuben submitted to Washington, at his request, 
suggestions for strengthening the military structure of the 
United States. Von Steuben's proposal, outlined in his 
pamphlet A Letter on the Subject of an Established Militia, 
and Militarv Arrangements. Addressed to the Inhabitants of the 
United States far exceeded the others in scope. Where the 
others stressed more uniformity, training, and discipline 
within the present militia structure, Steuben suggested the
*Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army, p. 74 
®Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 44.
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creation of three regionally based "Militia Legions."*® These 
new "Legions" bore a more than casual resemblance to one of 
Washington's own ideas for reforming the militia— abolish it 
in all but name,** Washington called his plan the "Continental 
Militia," which proposed a reserve force recruited, trained, 
and equipped on the national level,*^ Washington consolidated 
the reports of his subordinates and sent them to Alexander 
Hamilton, who had requested Washington's advice on the matter, 
on 2 May 1783.*̂
Hamilton, New York's delegate to Congress, chaired at 
that time a congressional committee investigating solutions to 
the nation's need to protect the western frontier, as well as 
to guard against Britain in the north, and Spain in the south. 
The proposals eventually submitted to Congress by Hamilton's 
committee echoed most of the ideas in Washington's Sentiments 
on a Peace Establishment, which the general had submitted to 
Congress as his recommendations for a post-war military. As
*®John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Armv; The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York; The Free Press, 1987), p, 25,
**Fitzpatrick, ed, , The Writings of Georae Washington. 
6:110. Washington's distrust in part-time soldiers shows 
throughout his writings. Here he hoped, after commanding 
militia in December on 1776, that he would only again command 
militia when absolutely necessary. He stressed that only long 
and hard training could turn civilians into soldiers who would not break under fire,
*^Ibid,, George Washington's "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," l May 1783, 26:374-398,
*̂ Ibid,
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did Washington, Hamilton urged the formation of a standing 
army, but with the stipulation that the national military be 
recruited, paid, and supplied by the confederal government. 
Hamilton also proposed that Congress commission all officers 
of the national army. Both ideas far exceeded any power given 
to the central government under the Articles of 
Confederation.
For the militia, Hamilton followed the advice of von 
Steuben and Washington but added more detail. Believing the 
militia concept fundamentally useless, he instead proposed a 
reserve corps of volunteers to be enlisted for eight years, 
paid and supplied by the national government, and liable for 
service wherever the national government ordered. This new 
institution would be city-based, because only the population 
density of the cities allowed the required numbers of 
militiamen to live close enough to the training areas to 
ensure regular drill. Numbers would be kept to 2 percent of 
those liable for militia service, and the old militia 
obligation for all adult white males would be allowed to 
lapse, in the belief that attempts to train the old, infirm, 
and uninterested only diverted money and talent that could be 
better used on an elite few.*^ Neither Hamilton nor von 
Steuben could see any merit in a militia that included all
‘'‘Harold Syrett, ed. , Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962) , "Report on a Military Peace Establishment" 3:378-379.
‘*Ibid.
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adult men; instead, they placed their hopes on the young, 
healthy, and enthusiastic. In a period where many Americans 
feared the power of the central government, and especially the 
potential for abuse by a standing army, Hamilton's proposals 
never had much chance of acceptance,'* Moreover, their plans 
for the militia, and even more so, the national army, exceeded 
any authority Congress received from the Articles of 
Confederation.
Later, Hamilton returned to the problems of creating a 
viable military force in a society hostile to a peacetime 
army. In Numbers 24 through 28 of the Federalist Papers, 
Hamilton argued that the nation needed a full-time 
professional army. In Number 24, he explained that the 
nation needed a military presence on the frontier and that 
either temporary detachments of militia or a small standing 
army would have to provide this presence. He then argued 
against using militia to garrison the west because of the 
added expense of constant rotations and the inevitable 
opposition by the militiamen themselves if subjected to 
repeated long-term service. In the Federalist Paper Number 25, 
he stressed that soldiering, like any other profession, needed
'^Richard Kohn, ed., Analo-American Militarv Tracts 1697- 1830 (New York: Arno Press, 1979), p. 173-192. An "ORATION 
DELIVERED AT BOSTON, MARCH 5, 1783" by Dr. Thomas Welsh 
revealed the distrust both of the standing army, and of the 
professional soldier, held by many Bostonians.
'^Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 188-207.
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at least a core of full-time practitioners if the nation were 
to be able to defend itself. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, the United states could legally prepare for war 
only after another nation either declared war, or actually 
invaded the United states. Hamilton saw potential external 
threats coming from Great Britain, Spain, and from the 
Indians.**
However, Hamilton argued from a national perspective. The 
states in the 1780s still saw themselves as independent 
nations rather than part of a single country. Hence, the 
representatives from Rhode Island could ask why their militia, 
as well as the militia from other Atlantic states, should have 
to protect the frontier of New York and Virginia.*® Westerners 
wondered why the burden for protecting the western borders 
should fall to the states on the frontier, while coastal 
states enjoyed protection without the cost.
The problem of the western border of the United States 
soon became confused by the overlapping of state and 
confederation jurisdiction. Both New York and Pennsylvania 
requested, in April 1783, assistance in dealing with the 
Indians in their western lands. New York would continue to 
press for the authority to raise a state army for the problem, 
for the Articles of Confederation required congressional
**Ibid., pp. 190-191.
*®Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 52.
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approval for any state to raise a standing army of its own.^® 
Less than a year later, in March 1784, Virginia officially 
ceded its claims to territory in the old Northwest.^* With the 
cession, the national government held territory independent of 
the states without having the means to protect the surveyors 
needed before the land could be sold. Congress also needed to 
remove the squatters who had been moving onto the lands, and 
to negotiate treaties with the Indians before the national 
government could begin to exploit its wealth in western 
lands.“
Making the situation more critical, on 2 June 1784, 
Congress discharged all but eighty of the remaining 600 men in 
the Continental Army.̂  The discharged men had been recruited 
near the end of the war and had needed additional inducements 
to join. All had been on a higher pay scale, with the 
additional pay coming from their home states of Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire. With the New England states blocking all 
efforts to create a standing army. Congress had no choice but 
to allow the enlistments to lapse. The few remaining active 
soldiers kept busy guarding the leftover Revolutionary War 
supplies stored at West Point, New York and Fort Pitt, at the
^Articles of Confederation, Article VI, Paragraph 4. 
^'Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 55.
^Ibid.
23̂Journals of the Continental Congress. Vol. XXVI, 
(Washington; General Services Administration, National Archives and Record Service, 1976), 26:524.
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source of the Ohio.^
Possessing no real army with which to act. Congress faced 
the ever-pressing problems of squatters and Indians. The 
problem of occupying the forts along the Great Lakes 
temporarily abated in September of 1783, when von Steuben 
reported back from Canada that the British would not evacuate 
the forts for another year or two. The war against Britain 
had barely ended and the new American government felt relieved 
when the British failed to evacuate the western forts. The 
British action temporarily lifted from Congress the burden of 
forging a plan to occupy the forts in order to keep the 
Indians from taking and possibly destroying them. Since it had 
no forces, however. Congress needed to decide on a plan for 
some show of force to people in the western lands— both Indian 
and squatter.
As a result of the inability of Washington and Hamilton 
to create a standing army, on 3 June 1784 Congress asked (for 
it had no power to demand) that the states of Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey provide a total of 700 
soldiers for twelve-months service on the frontier.^* With
^Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 57-60.
^^Fitzpatrick, ed. , The Writings of Georae Washington. 
27:120-121. In a letter of 29 August 1783 to Governor George Clinton, Washington expressed his concern over General von 
Steuben's report to Washington dated 22 Aug 1783 in which von 
Steuben indicated that the British were not leaving the forts.
^•^any authors see this force as the beginning of the 
United States Army that has existed up to the present. This theme is echoed in almost every secondary source that mentions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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this regiment. Congress had not created a true national army; 
the power base of this force remained in the states that 
raised it and not with the national government. Congress could 
only request that the states send the troops. In fact, 
Connecticut raised its troops too late for service, and New 
York did not raise a n y T h i s  First United States Regiment 
became "permanent" in April 1785 when, with the original 
enlistments about to expire, the states permitted Congress to 
enlist regulars for three years of service. Although not 
completely in compliance with Congress's authority to raise an 
army under the Articles of Confederation, this arrangement 
provided the only military force of the national government in 
the frontier areas until the new Constitution came into 
operation.
Those who argued against a standing army and for a 
reliance on the militia did not do so out of a desire to 
destroy the nation.^* Many had fully internalized the
the topic. See Chambers, To Raise an Armv. p. 24, Kohn, Eaale and Sword. p. 60, or Francis Prucha, The Sword of the 
Republic; The United States Armv on the Frontier 1783-1846 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 9.
^John K. Mahon, "Pennsylvania and the Beginnings of the Regular Army," Pennsvlvania Historv 21 (January 1954), 33-44.
^'congressman Elbridge Gerry from Marblehead, 
Massachusetts often led the fight against a standing army. In 
several speeches to the Confederation Congress, Gerry 
emotionally warned of the threats to liberty a standing army 
represented. He was a leading New England congressman and 
often pulled all the New England Congressmen with him in 
voting. The "Proclamation of 18 Oct 1783" in the Journals of 
the Continental Congress provides a good example of both his logic and style of expression.
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mythology of the embattled farmers of Lexington and Concord 
and fully believed in the ability of their militia to defeat 
regular troops. They knew the Continental Army played a 
major role in securing independence but saw a national army as 
an emergency measure to be invoked only when the survival of 
the republic demanded it. As with the debates in America 
before the Revolution, they saw in a standing army as great a 
threat to their liberties as an invasion by a foreign power. 
Whatever the drawbacks of the militia, it would always remain 
a voice of the populace and could not act against the people, 
for the people embodied the militia. With a standing army, the 
national government possessed the thin edge of a wedge with 
which slowly to destroy the liberty of the people. A standing 
army gave Congress both the reason to collect taxes (to pay 
for the army) and the means to enforce collection.
The regionalism of the United States also contributed to 
the reliance on militia. The relatively wealthy New England 
states saw no reason to send their well-equipped militia to
’̂Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The
Continental Armv and American Character. 1775-1783 (Chapel 
Hill: North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 333. Royster argues that lack of virtue within the militia forced reliance on the Continental Army.
’̂ Lawrence Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Armv and the
Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 46-47. Cress 
argues that radical Whig rhetoric popular in the 1760s 
continued to play a role in the political discourse of the 
nation, especially in New York and New England. In Boston, 
which had recent experience with regulars in the 1770s, 
opposition to standing armies remained deeply ingrained in the populace.
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the west to protect New York and Pennsylvania. The poorer 
states of the South, where militia duty often focused on 
control of slaves rather than Indians, looked on a national 
military force with less fear. Many Southerners saw a
standing army as a way to protect their exposed frontier areas 
without forcing free white men to accept army discipline. New 
York, with an exposed western frontier, an international 
border, and a dispute with Massachusetts over western New 
York, wanted permission to form a state army to deal with its 
problems. For more than a year. Congress stalled on New York's
request. With the formation of the First United States
Regiment, the United States in Congress Assembled did not see
any need to allow New York to create a standing army of its 
own.
The militia in this period did exceptionally little aside 
from providing an article of faith for those opposed to the 
creation of a standing army. Only two incidents of any size 
involved militia, and both underscored the problems of relying 
wholly on the militia for the republic's military purposes. 
From Kentucky, George Rogers Clark led an unauthorized 
expedition into the Ohio Valley against Indians using 1,200 
state militia. However, many of the militiamen Clark drafted 
for the expedition resisted— often with violence. The campaign 
quickly collapsed; desertion and insubordination destroyed any 
military effectiveness the expedition ever had. The Virginia
’’Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 58.
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government soon called Clark back to explain his actions. This 
aborted adventure served to underscore the difficulties in 
using part-time soldiers in an area far from their homes, and 
for purposes not immediately affecting them.
Late in the summer of 1786, another incident involving 
the militia proved to have a more far reaching impact on the 
country and its fundamental political system. Shays's 
Rebellion resulted from the unequal distribution of wealth 
between eastern and western Massachusetts. A shortage of 
specie caused by Britain's demand for hard currency from the 
newly independent United States hit New England especially 
hard. Western farmers, used to a barter-based economy, became 
desperate when their eastern commercial creditors began to 
demand currency, and almost none was available. This 
desperation soon led to a civil war in western Massachusetts. 
Daniel Shays built an army from the angry farmers of western 
Massachusetts. The Shaysites claimed that they wanted only to 
prevent the courts from seizing land and imprisoning farmers 
for debt, but the threat of anarchy terrified the state 
government in Boston. The situation became even more dangerous 
for leaders in eastern Massachusetts when the local militia of
^^Most of the summary of Clark's expedition was gleaned 
from Leonard C. Helderman, “The Northwest Expedition of George 
Rogers Clark, 1786-1787,” Mississippi Valiev Historical Review 25 (December 1938), 317-334.
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western Massachusetts failed to end the insurrection.^^ The 
affair exposed a serious weakness within both the militia 
system and the framework for a national army outlined in the 
Articles.
Without a regular professional army, the national 
government depended on the states to furnish the soldiers 
needed to end insurrections. However, the people of the area 
who were supposed to form the militia to quell the rebellion 
either joined the Shaysites, or at least remained in sympathy 
with them. The national government feared for the arsenal in 
Springfield, where surplus military stores from the revolution 
had been stored by the Continental Congress. Shays arrived in 
Springfield with an army of 1,100 men and forced the state 
supreme court out of the city. When the insurgents decided to 
take the federal arsenal, the national government could 
initially do little to prevent it. The handful of national 
soldiers guarding the arsenal were greatly outnumbered. Only 
the actions of the few loyal militia drawn from the market 
towns of western Massachusetts, and the confusion within the 
approaching Shaysite columns, prevented the capture of the 
arsenal before the arrival of a force from eastern 
Massachusetts. Panic swept Connecticut and New Hampshire as
”David P. Szatraary, Shavs' Rebellion; The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: The University of
Massachusetts Press, 1980), p. 80. When Shays's forces surrounded the Worcester county courthouse, the responses from Worcester militiamen to attempts to organize them for 
protecting the court ranged from evasion of duty to "flat denial."
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the rebellion grew. Massachusetts finally ended the rebellion 
without Congressional assistance after a half year of 
destruction and fear. To destroy Shays's army, enough militia 
men and volunteers from the eastern part of the state had to 
be mobilized and sent to the western part. Congress, and 
Washington, could do little but watch anxiously.^
In the end, state military forces ended the rebellion. At 
least in one sense, proponents of the militia system could 
feel vindicated by the outcome; an insurrection by a minority 
of citizens of the state had been controlled by the majority. 
However, leaders in eastern Massachusetts saw the impotence of 
the national government in keeping order and ending anarchy. 
The initial failure of the local militia to end the rebellion 
also alarmed many proponents of the militia. Many militiamen 
of western Massachusetts flouted militia discipline and either 
disobeyed orders or joined the rebels. From the frustration of 
the Confederation Congress in the crisis, and the new 
willingness of New England leaders to allow a ready force, the 
Constitutional Convention overcame the earlier qualms over a 
standing federal army when they met to strengthen the
^Ibid., pp. 102-103., Also, Prucha, Sword. p. 6. The 
Confederation Congress eventually authorized the calling of 
additional national troops— including 660 from Massachusetts—  
ostensibly to fight Indians. However, Knox confidentially 
wrote that he had assisting the government of Massachusetts in 
mind when he asked for the additional troops. Eventually, the 
state forces were able to end the rebellion before the new 
national forces intervened, and only two companies of the new 
national forces remained on active duty to guard the Springfield arsenal.
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government under the Articles in the spring of 1787
With the new federal Constitution of 1787, the framers 
sought to correct the weaknesses of the militia system 
apparent under the Articles of Confederation. In the new 
Constitution, Congress received expressed permission ”[t]o 
raise and support armies” without limiting that power to times 
of war or immediate threat thereof. The only check on 
Congress's power to raise armies concerned the financing of 
them. The budget could not be appropriated for more than two 
years at a time. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the same section 
concerned the militia in the new federal system. Congress 
received permission for "calling forth" (federalizing) "the 
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress 
insurrections, and repel invasion." The Constitution gave the 
position of Commander-in-Chief of both the army of the United 
States, and also the militia when in federal service, to the 
president.^^
In line with the suggestions of Hamilton and Washington 
for strengthening the militia. Congress received explicit
^^George Billias, Elbridqe Gerry; Founding Father and Republican Statesman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1776), pp. 149- 
152. Gerry had a fear of mob violence almost as strong as his 
fear of monarchical tyranny. When the rebellion began, Gerry 
saw the national government's potential response as the 
greater threat to liberty. Later he became reconciled to the 
idea that central power needed to be increased to prevent anarchy.
“United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, paragraph 12.
^^Ibid., Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 1.
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permission to organize, discipline, and arm the militia of the 
states, and to govern any part of the militia in federal 
service. States received the rights to commission militia 
officers and to enforce the federal standards in training the 
militia.^* As in the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution forbade the states from keeping standing armies 
in peacetime without federal permission.^’ Lest future 
generations misread federal authority over the state militia 
to mean that the federal government had the power either to 
abolish or forbid the states to keep a militia, the Bill of 
Rights specifically gave the states the right to keep a 
militia.*®
The evolution from a wartime national army constituted 
from regiments organized by the states, as outlined in the 
Articles of Confederation, to the standing army authorized in 
the Constitution, must be seen against the backdrop of the 
experience of confederation. The Articles came into existence 
in the middle of a struggle against Parliament's power over 
the colonies. The document framed during this time reflected 
the desire to be free and independent states. The militia 
contributed greatly to winning the War for Independence, but 
the Continental Army won the key battles that assured
^*Ibid., Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 16.
’̂Articles of Confederation, Article VI, section 4; Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Paragraph 3.
^^Constitution, Amendment II.
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independence.^* However, Americans did not fight the war to 
replace one perceived tyranny with another. As such, they 
retained their traditional Englishmen's suspicion of a 
standing army in peacetime. This sentiment had particular 
force in New England. In theory, the idea of an armed 
populace, the militia, sounded practical. Reality showed 
otherwise.
The new nation expected to pay off its war debt, and pay 
for much of the national expenses, with the sale of western 
lands. But no militia could be drawn from an area belonging to 
the states in common and having no legal white settlers. 
Shays's Rebellion demonstrated the drawbacks of the militia 
for ensuring domestic tranquility. Hardened to the realities 
of national sovereignty, the framers of the Constitution 
adopted a dual structure of United States land forces. The 
federal government created a standing army, and the states 
retained the right to maintain a militia that could both 
augment the federal force and serve the state. The Militia Act 
of 1792 put the constitutional ideal into law.
However, the enthusiasm needed to maintain the militia 
soon waned. Although the Act of 1792 required all males 
between 18 and 45 to arm themselves and attend a yearly
'"in his The Militarv Policy of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1907), a book in no way sympathetic to the 
concept or reality of militia, Emory Upton estimated that the 
Continental Army fielded a total of 231,771 soldiers during the course of the war, while the militia fielded 164,087. (p. 58) .
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muster, this law soon fell into disuse.During wartime, a 
related concept— the Volunteers— filled the militia role. 
Volunteers, first authorized in 1806, rested on dubious 
constitutional ground.While the president has broad powers 
to "raise and support armies," the Volunteers tended to be 
regiments organized from companies raised at the local level, 
with officers below the rank of general receiving their 
commissions from the governors of their respective states.^ 
Although the Constitution reserved the authority to raise 
regiments and commission officers to the states, the 
Volunteers were not true militia.'*^ Instead, the Volunteers 
were usually state forces raised for a specific period of 
federal service.
The militia, as proposed by the Founding Fathers, never 
existed in the United States. The experience in the 
Revolutionary War came closest, but after independence, the 
federal and state governments neglected to enforce the militia 
laws. Instead, what was commonly called "militia" was in 
reality organizations of volunteers organized on the local 
level. These men formed and joined companies either out of
*^USSL. Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 
XXXIII. sec. 1.
*^USSL. "An Act authorizing a detachment from the Militia 
of the United States." Ninth Congress. Sess. I. Chap XXXII, sec 2, 5.
^Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 12. 
‘*®Ibid. , Paragraph 16.
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patriotism, enjoyment, or local contacts, but not out of legal 
obligation.^ Therein began a legal fiction: the states
legitimized and supported these organizations, and in return 
these organizations performed traditional militia functions 
for the state. With these voluntary companies to assist the 
state government in strike-breaking, riot-control, and 
disaster relief, the states were relieved of the burden of 
enforcing a true militia law. In the years after the Civil 
War, states increasingly relied on these companies to disrupt 
organized labor during strikes. Their federal mission would 
not develop until after the begining of the twentieth century.
The transformation of these so-called militia units into 
the modern National Guard lasted the better part of a century. 
The first use of the term "National Guard" came in 1824 when 
certain units from New York adopted the title on the occasion 
of Lafayette's return to the United S t a t e s . B y  the end of 
the century, only three states had not adopted the term for 
their part-time state military forces.'** Whatever the name, 
these state-based companies did not enter federal service 
during the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish wars. Instead, they 
regrouped, often with mostly the same members, as units of
'•^Frederick P. Todd, "Our National Guard," Militarv 
Affairs 5 (Summer 1941): 73-86, 152-170.
'*'̂Col. Emmons Clark, Historv of the Seventh Regiment of New York. 1806-1889. (New York: 1890), 1:105.
48iiThe Organized Militia of the United States," War Department Document #32 (1897) p. 283.
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state Volunteers that were mustered into federal service, or 
as US Volunteers. This vaguely defined system for national 
defense that would last until the Militia Act of 1903 and the 
National Defense Act of 1916 again changed the paradigm.
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II. The Preparedness Debate
Leaders in America had been concerned with the proper 
balance of military force and preparedness since the 
Revolutionary War. The Militia Act of 1792 had been an attempt 
by the First Congress to provide a credible second line of 
defense without bankrupting the country or resorting to a 
militarization of American society. These two themes—  
credibility without militarization— became the focus of the 
preparedness debate of the early twentieth century. In 
retrospect, the Spanish-American War represented the swan-song 
of the old system, and the Great War marked the dawn of the 
modern American military establishment. However, in the 
decades before the sinking of the USS Maine, the debate had 
already crystallized into two main groups. Both groups agreed 
that militia remained negligible as long as states retained 
control over any aspects of them. The two groups differed over 
the proper mix of regulars and reservists and the time needed 
to turn an American civilian into a competent soldier.
In the century following the adoption of the 
Constitution, Congress made no substantial changes to the 
Militia Act of 1792. However, in the years following the War
26
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of 1812, the militia as an institution fell into disuse.' Few 
Americans, including Congressmen, saw any need for citizens to 
waste time drilling when no danger threatened and more 
profitable pursuits beckoned.̂  Instead, the army expanded 
during the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish-American Wars through 
the institution of the United States Volunteers. The 
Volunteers, not mentioned in the Constitution, resembled more 
the military system envisioned by the framers of the Articles 
of Confederation. Volunteer regiments usually consisted of ten 
companies of roughly eighty men locally recruited. The men 
from each company elected their officers; the governor of the 
state would appoint the regimental officers; and the regiment 
would then be mustered into federal service for a prior 
agreed-on period.^ The Regular Army, dwarfed during the Civil 
War by the Volunteers, remained intact, although individual 
officers could get leaves of absence to accept commissions 
with the state-based Volunteers. In the years after the Civil 
War, increased professionalism within the Regular Army led to
'Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 15.; Weigley, 
Historv of United States Army, pp. 156-157.
^In slave holding areas, a greater percentage of the white male population participated in the organized militia. 
However, this formed more a posse against the threat of slave 
insurrection than a true military force.
^Volunteer Act of 1806. Twelfth Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 
32. sec. 2-5. This was the first act authorizing the president to call for Volunteers corps from the states.
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a debate over the future composition of the wartime army.^ In 
the preparedness debate that began in America after the summer 
of 1914, the somewhat abstract speculations of the 1880s 
became urgent arguments as the nation sought the proper 
balance of trained professional soldiers and patriotic 
citizen-soldiers in a world that suddenly seemed far more 
dangerous.
The first group to challenge the status quo followed the 
teachings of Emory Upton, a Civil War hero and protege of 
General William T. Sherman. Although Upton's The Militarv 
Policv of the United States would not be published until 1904, 
copies of it passed through the War Department during the 
decades before the turn of the century.̂ Upton's work combined 
his interpretation of American military history with his 
infatuation with the German military. Arguing that state 
control of, and influence on, militia would always make it 
unreliable to the federal army as an effective reserve, Upton 
sought a long-term reserve force wholly under federal control. 
Regardless of the geographical, cultural, and political 
differences between Germany and the United States, the concept
^Edward M. Coffman, The Old Armv: A Portrait of the
American Armv in Peacetime. 1784-1898 (New York; Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 269-272.
*Emory Upton, The Militarv Policv of the United States (Washington, GPO, 1904); also, Stephen Ambrose, Uoton and the 
Armv (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964). 
The final chapter, "Influence," traces some of the effects of 
Upton's unpublished work on the army from his death in March 1881 until the Great War.
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of locally recruited and locally supported units became 
anathema to the disciples of Emory Upton. Instead# the 
Uptonites sought total federal control over recruiting# 
organizing# and leading of any non-Regular forces to be 
employed in war.
Although written for the educated layman, Upton's book 
remained out of reach for many Americans. Harris Dickson, a 
convinced Uptonite, attempted to popularize the lessons of 
Militarv Policv in a much shorter work. The Unpopular Historv 
of the United States bv Uncle Sam Himself.̂  To make his point# 
Dickson assumed the role of a chastising Uncle Sam who warned 
Americans of the folly of the militia myth. From the 
Revolutionary War through the nineteenth century. Uncle Sam 
showed the unreliability of militia in war. At the end. Uncle 
Sam praised the recently established mechanism for a 
"selective draft" as the only truly democratic way to defend 
the nation. He urged that the nation should train its youth in 
basic military skills so that they could reap the benefits of 
patriotism and exercise in peacetime, become competent 
soldiers in less time upon reaching adulthood, and perhaps 
avoid being slaughtered in wartime.
An even closer emulation of Upton's book can be found in 
The Militarv Unoreparedness of the United States: A History of 
American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1. 1915 by
“Harris Dickson, The Unpopular Historv of the United 
States bv Uncle Sam Himself as Recorded in Uncle Sam's Own 
Words (New York: Frederick A Stokes Co., 1917).
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Frederic HuidekoperThis book attempted to improve and 
update Upton's work. The author claimed to have filled the 
holes in Upton's Militarv Policv. which he may have done, but 
at the expense of clarity. Like Upton, the main purpose of the 
book, as obvious from the title, was to show that the nation 
constantly fell short in military preparedness and later paid 
in blood. Also in line with Upton, the book showed the 
constant weakness of the militia system that resulted from 
state control. The book concluded with Huidekoper's 
suggestions for improving American military preparedness. Like 
many in the debate, he called for an enlarged Regular Army, 
which would serve as a school for a body of federal reserves. 
After two years active service, a soldier would enter the 
reserves for five years. Under Huidekoper's system, the 
militia, as a state-controlled force, would end.
However, the concept of the citizen-soldier remained 
embedded in the American psyche. Certain high ranking 
soldiers, led by General Leonard Wood, reached the opposite 
conclusions from Upton. To Wood, the average American male 
could be transformed into a competent soldier with only a few 
months of intensive training. The better element (ie: the
educated classes) of society could be made into officers in a 
slightly longer period. Wood, however, remained something of
^Frederic Huidekoper, Militarv Preparedness of the United 
States; A Historv of American Land Forces from Colonial times 
until June 1. 1915 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915). The
introduction of the book was written by Major General Leonard Wood.
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a maverick in the army. Not a West Pointer, Wood received his 
original commission as a doctor in the army medical corps. 
During the Spanish-American War, Theodore Roosevelt and his 
Rough Riders impressed Wood both with their unfamiliarity with 
military procedures, and with their ability to follow orders 
and accomplish missions. A decade later, in the preparedness 
debate. Wood placed great faith in the citizen-soldier. To 
train educated civilians in the rudiments of military life, he 
began to hold a series of summer training camps, the first of 
which he established at Plattsburg, New York. At these camps. 
Wood began to put his faith into practice, often with noted 
success. The educated men adapted well to military life, and 
learned the rudiments of soldiering faster than most regulars 
believed they would.*
Throughout this period. Wood spoke frequently on the need 
for Universal Military Service. Three of his speeches appeared 
in book form in The Militarv Obligation of Citizenship.’ As 
the title implied. Wood's belief that citizenship carried an 
obligation of military service provided a recurring theme of 
the three speeches. In "The Policy of the United States in 
Raising and Maintaining Armies," delivered at Princeton on 15
*John Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers; The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement. 1913-1920 (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1972) ; also Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, California;Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 193-196.
^Leonard Wood, The Militarv Obligation of Citizenship 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915).
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April 1915, Wood argued that "[t]he experience of the 
Revolution should have taught us that it is not safe in real 
war to depend on Volunteers."*® Instead, he maintained, the 
United States needed to require military service from all, as 
the army saw fit. Perhaps facing reality. Wood's position 
transformed between the first speech in the book and the 
third. On 15 June 1915, Wood gave a speech entitled "The Civil 
Obligation of the Army" at St. Paul's School. Only two months 
after calling for the elimination of the Volunteer system, 
Wood instead outlined his plan to improve the Volunteers. If 
the Volunteers were to be of any use in the next war, "we must 
have a great body of 35,000 or 40,000 reserve officers trained 
and ready to serve as officers of Volunteers."** Wood 
accepted, at least partially, that the Volunteers would most 
likely continue to have a role in the American military. 
However, his summer camps for training reserve officers would 
ensure that in future wars, the Volunteers would be led by 
officers with some military training. In the same speech, he 
remarked on his admiration for the Swiss and Australian 
systems of military instruction at school, combined with a 
period in the reserves for all the able-bodied. He never 
abandoned his desire for universal service. During the same 
period. Maxwell Van Zandt Woodhull, a former Brevet Brigadier- 
General of Volunteers from the Civil War, published West Point
*®Ibid., p. 10
**Ibid. , p. 63
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in our Next War: The Only Wav to Create and Maintain an
Armv. In this book, he explained that with a year or two of 
service. Volunteers were as competent soldiers as Regulars. 
However, with the advances in shipping and the complexity of 
war, the nation could no longer rely on Volunteers. The army 
needed to be able to fight on the first day of a war. With 
obligations in Alaska, the Canal Zone, the Philippines, and 
other areas outside the United States, the army remained 
wholly insufficient for its role, whether in war or peace. To 
remedy this, Woodhull proposed an immediate expansion of the 
Regular Army. Then, drawing on his Civil War experiences, he 
proposed the establishment of a federal corps of trained 
reserve officers to lead an expanded wartime army. To this 
end, he hoped to modify West Point so that some students could 
attend a two year program, after which they would re-enter 
civilian life. During a war, they would serve as officers for 
the expanded army.
The problem of a tiny Regular Army with far-flung 
military obligations also inspired a curious book by Hudson 
Maxim entitled Defenseless America. Written with the 
blessings of General Wood, whose letter to Maxim appears in 
the book, Maxim's work aimed at awakening the public and
‘̂ Maxwell Woodhull, West Point in our Next War; The Only 
Way to Create and Maintain an Armv (New York: G.P.Putnam'sSons, 1915).
Hudson Maxim, Defenseless America (New York: Hearst's International Library Co., 1915).
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government to the dangers of modern war. Maxim took great 
pains to show the vulnerability of the nation and urged a 
large military build-up. Without naming the potential foe, 
Maxim warned of the calamity of a future invasion of American 
territory. Using the example of the Great War, he showed that 
America needed to begin producing more guns, planes, and 
soldiers immediately if disaster were not to befall the 
nation.
Another book, written before the Great War began but not 
published until 1915, also envisioned the Regular Army as a 
training school for an expanded war-time army. This book. The 
American Armv. by William Harding Carter, traced what he saw 
as a fundamental shift in the role of the Regular Army.*'* To 
Carter, the Regulars no longer trained to fight as an army, 
but to prepare reservists for an expanded army. In other 
words, the Regular Army existed as a corps of instructors for 
an expanded war-time army. Retired Commanding General Nelson 
Miles also subscribed to this idea of the regulars as a 
skeleton from which to expand the army in wartime. In 
testimony to Congress in February of 1916, Miles pressed for 
a forces of between 140,000 and 150,000, which would expand in 
war to a half million men. Miles bitterly opposed a 
conscripted federal reserve army, which he saw as an attempt
*‘*William Carter, The American Armv (Indianapolis: TheBobbs-Merrill Co., 1915), pp. 31-49.
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to Germanize America.
The opposite approach came from "The Debater's Handbook 
Series" volume. National Defense, which specifically called 
for universal training, followed by at least one year on 
active duty and a longer period in the reserves for all 
males.’® This book presented a sampling of arguments on the 
preparedness issue, but all concluded with a call for 
increases in overall national readiness. The bibliography at 
the beginning listed pacifist groups and publications as well 
as preparedness groups, but the essays all supported an 
expanded military.
Not all books from the debate carried a strong agenda. 
Less biased and more informative was Militarv and Naval 
America by Captain Harrison Kerrick of the army. . While he 
did use the first chapter to show with various statistics the 
deficiency of the United States in all areas from artillery to 
ships, a break-down of every aspect of the American military 
fills most of the book. Kerrick explained not only the various 
branches of the army and navy, but also the militia, military 
colleges. Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and Boy Scouts. Rather than a
’̂ Robert Wooster, Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the 
Frontier Armv (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993),
pp. 260—261.
’®Agnes Van Valkenburgh, ed., Selected Articles on National Defense including Compulsory Militarv Service. Vol. 
2 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1917).
’̂ Harrison Kerrick, Militarv and Naval America (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1915).
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political tract, Kerrick's book filled the role of primer of 
the total military resources of the United States.
One American probably spoke louder on the issue of 
preparedness than any other, Theodore Roosevelt. In his book. 
Fear God and Take Your Own Part, he mused on a number of 
aspects that bothered him.** Although he could not decide 
which problem loomed larger— Mexico or Germany— he definitely 
found fault with the president's handling of both problems. In 
the chapter "A Sword For Defence", Roosevelt called for 
universal service in both peace and war. He railed against 
what he called the "failed" system of Great Britain—  
volunteers— and instead urged a system of obligatory service, 
as in Germany, Switzerland, and Australia. He also pushed for 
an expansion of the Plattsburg Camps, which his son attended, 
as well as for military instruction in the public schools. 
Perhaps most surprising, given his fame with the Rough Riders 
and his later attempts to recruit a regiment for the Great 
War, was his critique of the Volunteers. He explained that the 
inequities of the Volunteer system prevented it from meeting 
the nation's military needs. Under the Volunteer system, 
patriotic and virtuous men carried the burden for the lazy and 
timid. The preparedness issue, however, filled only one 
section of the book, for Roosevelt's mind soon dashed off to 
tackle the problems of hyphenated Americanism, the treachery
‘̂ Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1916).
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of pacifism, Armenia, and again, Mexico.
For reasons unconnected with anti-militarism, a powerful 
lobbying group in Washington opposed the creation of a 
federally controlled reserve. The National Guard Association 
lobbied for recognition as the second line of defense, behind 
the Regular Army. Unfortunately for the National Guard, 
Attorney General George W. Wickersham issued an opinion in 
February 1912 that as militia, National Guard could not be 
used beyond the borders of the United States.Carter, as 
well as the National Guard itself, bemoaned this 
Constitutional barrier. Fearing that they might be shunted 
aside in favor of a new federal reserve, the National Guard 
Association lobbied hard for a solution to the Constitutional 
barrier, and to secure recognition as the second line of 
defense.
One of the works from the period that opposed the 
preparation movement was Preparedness: The American versus The 
Military Programme by William Hull.^* After a careful 
examination of the threat to the United States by a first rate
‘’George Kearney, ed., Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States Advising the President and Heads 
of Departments in relation to Their Official Duties 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), 29:322-329.
Attorney General George W. Wickersham expressed his opinions 
in a letter to the Secretary of War on 17 February 1912.
“̂Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp. 28-32.
‘̂william Hull, The American versus The Militarv Programme 
(New York: Fleming H. Revel 1 Co., 1916), pp. 268-271. Hull was 
a professor of History and International Relations at Swarthmore Co1lege.
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power, Hull reasoned that America could not remain free and 
still meet the threat by military means. He explained that the 
numbers of men needed and training required would result in a 
Prussianization of American society. Partial preparation only 
wasted time, money, and later, lives. Instead, Hull argued 
that America could best help to end the war in Europe, and war 
in general, by setting an example for the world. The only 
purpose for the United States military should be for the 
policing of the areas under United States' sovereignty but not 
part of a state, and for the patrolling of the three-mile 
limit on the ocean for pirates. Hull fell short when he 
attempted to explain how a foreign invader would be stopped. 
He envisioned a world that followed America's example and one 
that would have international agreements on peace. Beyond that 
hope, he offered no ideas for reaction if an invasion actually 
occurred.
By 1915, President Woodrow Wilson had shifted from a 
traditional Progressive position of opposition to militarism 
to one in favor of preparedness.^^ Although he reassured the 
National Guard that he had no plans to dissolve it, he had 
become an Uptonite.̂  In response to the war in Europe, Wilson 
backed a plan by Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison that 
called for an expansion of the Regular Army, increases in the
^^Arthur S. Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crises 1915-1916 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 21.
23Ibid., p. 21,
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navy, and a large reserve force completely under federal 
control.^ To placate the National Guard, the Guard would 
receive a slight increase in federal support, but would be 
relegated to police duties. However, traditional suspicion of 
military expansion remained strong, especially in the 
president's own party, the Democrats. The Secretary of State, 
William Jennings Bryan, broke with the administration to fight 
against the president's plan. Bryan felt, as did many 
opponents to preparedness, that Americans would fight if the 
nation were invaded. However, as no nation seemed about to 
invade, preparedness would be the first step on road towards 
European-style militarism.^ With massive opposition from 
within his own party, and the resignation of Secretary of War 
Garrison, Wilson's attempts at improving the defenses of the 
nation appeared dead by February 1916.
The preparedness debate continued unresolved until 
President Wilson asked for and received a declaration of war 
on the central powers. However, some consensus was reached. 
The country as a whole seemed unwilling to support universal 
military training, but it did support voluntary training. In 
the years before the Great War, Americans found conscription 
as repugnant as it had been to their grandfathers. Americans 
opposed forcing men into uniform before an actual state of war 
existed. By the time the U.S. declared war, little of the
^Ibid., p. 18. 
^Ibid., pp. 30-33.
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eventual compromise for preparedness had been implemented. The 
partisans of preparedness had not devised a plan for a nation 
at war, but a nation at peace. Thus, Wilson turned to a very 
different model for the organization of the army in the Great 
War. However, some of the goals of the preparedness advocates 
became part of the National Defense Act of 1916. Only the 
short time span between its passage and America's entry into 
war nullified most of the significance of the preparedness 
measures.
The National Defense Act of 1916 compromised between the 
various schools of thought on preparedness. Wood's training 
camps received official recognition. The National Guard took 
a dual oath and became the official second line of defense. 
The Volunteer system remained in theory, with an expansion of 
R.O.T.C. and Plattsburg-type camps to train its future 
officers.^ The realities of mobilization against the Central 
Powers altered the plan somewhat, but the debate over 
preparedness had brought to the foreground most of the 
proposed changes that the National Defense Act would later 
embody. However, a vague and distant threat of war from Europe 
could not incite Americans to alter the basic structure of 
their army. Instead, a very near and real problem on the 
Mexican border provided the catalyst for implementing the 
changes proposed during the debate over preparedness.
^^ational Defense Act of 1916, Sixty-fourth Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 134. sec 37.
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III. The Mexican Border as a Catalyst for Change
The debate over preparedness reflected a growing 
realization that the military system needed adjustment. 
However, real change would come only after the old system 
proved unable to meet the defense needs of the nation. Far 
more than the potential for American involvement in the war in 
Europe, real problems on the Mexican border demonstrated to 
Americans that the old relationship between militia and 
Regular Army was no longer adequate to the mission of 
protecting the United States and allowing the president to 
project American military power.
The military system created in the early days of the 
republic served fundamentally unchanged throughout the 
nineteenth century. The United States fought the War of 1812, 
the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, 
plus a few Indian Wars, with little change to the system. As 
was the case in the 1780s, problems on the border of the 
United States exposed the weaknesses in the system. The use of 
Volunteers in the Mexican and Spanish Wars averted the 
Constitutional problem of using militia outside the territory 
of the United States, but after the Spanish-American War the 
National Guard replaced the Volunteers as the method for
40
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expanding the army in wartime. In the second decade of the
twentieth century, the Mexican border, rather than the old
Northwest, presented a problem for the land forces of the
United States that the existing structure was ill-equipped to 
handle.
Before the outbreak of revolution in 1910, Mexico was 
regarded as a model of pre-industrialized stability. Before 
stability returned to Mexico, America would get a rude
awakening on the inadequacy of the Regular Army and the 
National Guard. Almost alone among western powers, the United 
States had no federal military reserves— no established system 
for expanding the small standing army into a large force if 
needed quickly.
Problems with Mexico, combined with the territorial 
expanse of the American empire, soon exposed the inadequacy of 
the old system. With most of the Regular Army troops based in 
the United States on an expeditionary force into Mexico, the 
president called the entire National Guard to the Mexican 
border to prevent more crossings by Mexican guerrillas. While 
the American army was occupied on the border and in Mexico, 
events in Europe drew the United States closer to world war. 
America faced this situation with no reserves left.
Before the United States entered the European war, Mexico 
provided a small-scale test for the American defense system. 
Although the actual combat in Mexico more closely resembled 
the later Indian campaigns than the European war, the campaign
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in Mexico allowed the army to glimpse the future. The American 
expedition took airplanes, motor vehicles, and radios into 
Mexico. Both Regular Army and National Guard officers received 
experience in leading large numbers of men. Without the 
experience with Mexico, the American Expeditionary Force 
General Pershing took to France would have been far less 
prepared or competent.
In 1910, the Mexican president, Porfirio Diaz, dictator 
for thirty years, announced that he would step down and that 
elections would be held. Francisco Madero, a believer in legal 
process, announced he would run for the office. Diaz promptly 
had him arrested and announced his decision to run again 
despite his earlier promise to step down. Without the ability 
to change the government by peaceful means, Madero took up the 
cause of Revolution.*
However, with the federal army behind him, Diaz soon 
crushed the rebellion. Madero was not the only revolutionary. 
Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Pascual Orozco in the north, and 
Emiliano Zapata in the south, took up the struggle against 
Diaz. The balance of power in Mexico shifted from beneath 
Diaz, as he lost control of the countryside and his poorly led 
army proved unequal to the task of keeping him in power. With 
mounting forces against Diaz, his thirty-year rule collapsed,
‘Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 1, Porfirians. 
Liberals and Peasants (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 55-71.
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and he fled the country. Madero then became president.̂
Madero, a moderate, proved unable or unwilling to push 
through the drastic reform measures demanded by the 
revolutionaries. Eventually, the army rebelled, and President 
Madero called in the alcoholic General Victoriano Huerta to 
put down the uprising. After a ten-day battle in Mexico City, 
Huerta switched sides and had Madero shot. Huerta then claimed 
the presidency of Mexico. The United States never recognized 
the Huerta government.̂
The assassination of Madero threw Villa into fits of 
rage. A new rebellion against against this blatantly illegal 
seizure of power eventually put the Constitutionalist 
Venustiano Carranza in the presidency. Never happy with peace. 
Villa continued to rebel against the central government in 
Mexico City from his native state of Chihuahua on the Texas 
border.
From the start, the U.S.-Mexican border played an 
important role in the revolution.* On the American side of the 
border, revolutionaries plotted in safety. Revolutionaries
^Ibid., pp. 171-244.
^Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico; Europe, the 
United States, and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 158-162.
*Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, p. 159; Knight, The 
Mexican Revolution, p. 331.
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could buy arms and ammunition from American dealers.̂  Across 
the border. Villa could sell his rustled cattle to raise money 
for his army. But the border could also be a disadvantage. 
Exiled members of the old Mexican ruling class could interfere 
with the internal affairs of Mexico from the comfort of San 
Antonio or El Paso. The United States government could at 
least hinder the arms trade with factions out of favor. Every 
bullet hole north of the border brought the threat of American 
intervention to restore order by force.®
The threat was not an empty one. Under the Monroe 
Doctrine, the United States assumed the responsibility to act 
on behalf of the European powers in the New World. With the 
United States hostile to the idea of direct European 
involvement, the European powers pressed the United States to 
protect international investments in Mexico. In April 1914, 
the American navy seized the Mexican port city of Veracruz, 
the invasion route during the Mexican-American War, over a 
perceived slight against the U.S.S. Dolphin, when the local 
garrison refused to present a twenty-one gun salute to the 
American flag. Nerves had already been strained over the 
arrest of a group of American sailors as they came ashore and 
over the presence of a German cargo ship suspected of carrying
®Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, Revolution and the 
Border (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1988), pp. 16-19, 25.
®John S. D. Eisenhower, Intervention!; The United States 
and theMexican Revolution 1913-1917 (New York; W. W. Norton and Company, 1993), p. 191.
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arms. Later, the United States Army took over occupation of 
the city from the navy and Marine Corps. Eventually the 
governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile mediated a 
settlement, and the army left in late November.^
In 1915, after breaking with Carranza, Villa suffered a 
series of defeats at the hands of the Constitutionalist 
General Alvaro Obregon. During April, Villa lost two battles 
at Celaya, followed in May by a defeat at Leon. The final 
battle in this series came that July in Aguascalientes. Each 
time, Obregon used the modern tools of warfare— the trench, 
barbed wire, and machine guns— to destroy Villa's army in the 
same manner that Europeans were destroying each other in the 
Great War. Obregon goaded Villa's vanity and Villa reacted 
accordingly— launching massed assaults until his army lay in 
heaps in the area northwest of Mexico City.*
Villa gathered the remnants of his army and returned to 
northern Sonora. In early November, the battle at Agua Prieta, 
across the border from Douglas, Arizona, finally destroyed 
what was left of Villa's army and prestige.’ To compound 
matters, during the battle. Villa learned that President 
Wilson had granted official recognition to the government of 
Carranza. Villa also learned that the United States had
^Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, pp. 196-202.
*John Mason Hart, Revolutionarv Mexico: The Coming and 
Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of california Press, 1987), p. 311.
’Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 327-328.
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allowed the Constitutionalists to reinforce the border town of 
Agua Prieta by use of trains passing through United States' 
territory.For Villa, the Americans now provided both a 
target for his anger and a chance to win back his honor in the 
eyes of the people of northern Mexico."
In mid-January of 1916, an event in the town of Santa 
Ysabel completely changed Villa's reputation in the United 
States." Previously Villa enjoyed the image of a Mexican 
Robin Hood. After Santa Ysabel, Americans saw him as a blood 
thirsty killer of United States citizens.
From November 1915, the Carranza government had been 
assuring American mining companies that the violence of the 
Revolution was over and that operations at the mines could 
continue. In January of 1916, the Cusi Mining company sent a 
group of American and Mexican employees from El Paso into 
Chihuahua to reopen the mines. At the cattle station of Santa 
Ysabel, west of Chihuahua city, a blockade on the tracks 
stopped the train. A party of Mexicans, under Colonel Pablo 
Lopez of Villa's army, boarded the train. The armed men forced 
the Americans off the train, had them remove their clothes, 
and shot all of them." One American feigned death and escaped
‘“Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United 
States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London; Collier- Macmillan Ltd., 1969), pp. 186-187.
"Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crisis, p. 196.
"Hart, Revolutionarv Mexico, p. 321.
"Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 344-355.
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to tell the story. Although the incident brought no direct 
action from President Wilson, the American people now thought 
of Villa as an enemy of the United States and a murderer of 
Americans. The American Army would not begin chasing Villa 
because of the murders at Santa Ysabel, but very shortly the 
army would receive its marching orders into Mexico because of 
an even greater outrage.'*
In the early months of 1916, rumors of an impending 
attack from across the Mexican border became common among the 
United States soldiers on the American s i d e . B y  the first 
week of March, reports that Villa had moved north reached 
Colonel Herbert J. Slocum, commander of the 13th Cavalry 
Regiment stationed at Camp Furlong in Columbus, New Mexico.'*' 
Since rumors also placed Villa all over northern Chihuahua, 
Slocum did not give much credence to the reports. Moreover, 
President Wilson had given orders preventing American forces 
from crossing the border to gather information, which left 
Slocum with little reliable intelligence on his potential 
adversary. On the 5 th or the 6 th of March, the War
'*Link, Confusions and Crisis, pp. 201-203.
'^Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho 
Villa; A Study in Unconventional Diolomacv (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 236-238.
'"Frank E. Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of 
John J. Pershing (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), pp. 603-604.
'̂ Col. Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa: The Storv Behind the 
Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico (Harrisburg: The 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1934), p. 42. As a major
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Department sent Slocum a report of "reliable" information that 
Villa would cross the border to surrender to the Americans, 
and "unreliable" information that villa would raid towns on 
the American side of the border.'*
Three miles south of Columbus, New Mexico, on the Mexican 
border, two detachments of United States cavalry from Columbus 
stood watch.*’ Villa broke his army of about five hundred 
mounted men into small groups and moved through a gap between 
the two detachments and into United States' territory. After 
consolidating on the American side of the border. Villa's army 
headed towards Columbus. A half mile before the town. Villa 
again divided his forces. At about four-thirty in the morning, 
before the sun began to lighten the sky, the Villistas began 
their attack. One column attacked from the west into the 
middle of the town, while the other attacked from a southerly 
route into Camp Furlong, located in the southeast corner of 
the town.^®
Militarily, the raid ended in failure for Villa. Although 
few Americans except for the camp cooks were awake when the
stationed at Columbus during Villa's raid, Tompkins led the 
pursuit across the international border immediately following 
the raid.
*®Ibid., p. 46; Link, Confusions and Crisis, p. 205.
'’Herbert Molloy Mason Jr., The Great Pursuit: GeneralJohn J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition across the Rio Grands 
to Destroy the Mexican Bandit Pancho Villa (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 9.
Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 48-49.
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raid began, the Americans quickly organized a stiff 
resistance. Most of the American officers lived in the town, 
many with their families, and were cut off from their men. The 
Americans nevertheless rallied against the attackers. The 
Mexicans broke into small groups in face of the American 
machine guns. In ninety minutes, four Benet-Mercier machine 
guns fired about 20,000 rounds, despite the tendency of the 
weapons to jam.̂ '
Although this seems like an enormous waste of ammunition, 
the machine guns greatly aided the Americans by laying a 
suppressive fire that forced the Mexicans to seek cover and 
robbed them of freedom of movement. The machine guns, although 
complicated to load even in daylight and prone to jamming, 
gave the Americans a large advantage over the attacking 
Mexicans
Another reason the raid broke down was that the Mexicans 
expected to find only a small garrison. Finding instead many 
American soldiers, the Mexicans broke into small, isolated, 
and confused groups in the darkness. Often their fire served 
only to signal their position to the Americans.^ By 6:30, 
when the Mexican bugler sounded retreat, some sixty-seven 
Mexicans lay dead in Columbus. Another five had been captured
‘̂ibid. , pp. 52-53. The account of the machine guns comes from the report of a Lieutenant Lucas who took charge of the machine guns during the battle.
“Eisenhower, Intervention!. pp. 222-223. 
“Ibid.
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and were executed by hanging.^ As the Mexicans headed back 
towards the border, the Americans began a counter attack. 
Under the leadership of Major Frank Tompkins, fifty-nine 
Americans hounded the raiders until lack of water and 
shortages of ammunition forced them to abandon the chase 
fifteen miles south of the border.“ During the retreat from 
Columbus, the Mexicans lost another hundred killed, as well as 
two of their own machine guns and most of the plunder taken 
from the town.̂ **
When Major Tompkins reached the border fence, his troops 
cut through, and the American force continued in hot pursuit 
onto Mexican territory. After an initial skirmish with Villa's 
rear guard. Major Tompkins sent word back to Colonel Slocum on 
the situation and asked for instructions. Forty-five minutes 
later the reply came for the major to use his own judgement.^ 
Tompkins continued the pursuit into Mexico. Eventually, on an 
open plain, the Mexicans realized how few Americans followed 
them and turned to fight. The Americans pulled back to a 
defensible position on a mound and waited for the Mexicans to 
attack. After forty-five minutes of waiting, the Americans 
headed back towards Columbus, passing on their way between 
seventy-five and one hundred dead Mexicans killed on the
^Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 53. 
^Ibid., p. 56.
2‘lbid.
^Ibid.
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Mexican side of the border.^*
Psychologically, another, stronger border had also been 
crossed. Although Wilson was quite content to send special 
agents into Mexico and land the Marines at Veracruz, he had 
forbidden the United States Army from crossing the border into 
Mexico. To him, despite his almost constant meddling in the 
Mexican Revolution since taking office, the United States held 
a neutral stance in the struggle.As long as those Latins 
elected good men, Wilson would respect their rights as a 
sovereign nation. Unfortunately, from Wilson's perspective, 
those Latins refused to cooperate, which forced him to become 
ever more deeply involved in Mexico.“
The Mexicans, for their part, held a strong antipathy 
towards the United States. Less than seventy years had passed 
since the United States annexed half of Mexico following the 
Mexican-American War, and the resentment remained.^* Under the 
Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed the responsibility 
to protect European interests in Mexico. For the Mexicans, 
this simply meant that the Yankees ignored Mexican sovereignty 
whenever the Mexicans threatened to stop the export of
2*ibid., p. 57.
^atz. The Secret War, p. 195.
’"Ibid., pp. 156-157.
’’The Gadsden Purchase of 1853 further increased the 
Mexican fear of another land grab by the United States. Many 
Mexicans felt, with good reason, that the United States would 
use the current unrest in Mexico to annex more territory. Some 
in Congress were interested in acquiring Baja California.
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Mexico's wealth. In 1910 Americans held more invested wealth 
in Mexico than the Mexicans.The occupation of Veracruz 
stirred up all the old anti-American feelings within the 
Mexicans. By railing against the Americans and threatening the 
border. Villa, or any other revolutionary, could become a 
popular hero to the masses of Mexicans.And after his defeat 
at Agua Prieta, Villa definitely needed a boost to his 
popularity.
Fears on the American side that fighting in Mexico might 
spill into the United States had brought the US Army to the 
border in 1911. However, the revolutionary armies of Mexico 
stopped short of actually crossing the border, although at 
times the United States government did allow favored factions 
to use American railroads. Most of the duties for the United 
States Army on the border involved attempting to stop the flow 
of arms that poured south. Occasionally a few towns in Texas 
lured bandits who would rob and flee, but never on the scale 
of the Columbus raid.^ The Columbus raid was a calculated 
attack on an American town. Villa himself maintained a 
personal relationship with US Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott, 
who could never bring himself to believe that Villa took part
^̂ Katz, The Secret War, pp. 20-26.
”Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 205 
"Ibid., pp. 195-196.
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in the raid.^^
After the raid, the United States government entered into 
a diplomatic dance with the Mexican government of President 
Venustiano Carranza.Although the Mexican and United States 
governments had agreements permitting mutual hot pursuit of 
outlaws across the border dating back to Indian problems 
thirty years before, the Constitutionalist government of 
Carranza could not stand the domestic political fallout if he 
allowed American forces to enter unopposed. President 
Carranza sent the American State Department a note through 
Special Agent John R. Silliman on 10 March 1916, in which he 
gave his interpretation of the events in Columbus. According 
to him. Villa had been driven to the reckless attack on 
Columbus by the "persistent pursuit" of the Constitutionalist 
General Gutierrez. After a summary of the cross-border Indian 
raids a generation earlier, Carranza requested that if Villa 
repeated the raid, the armies of both countries be allowed to 
cross the border in hot pursuit.^* The United States 
government, however, was more interested in destroying Villa 
before he had a chance to raid another border town.
Also on 10 March, President Wilson held a cabinet meeting
^*Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: The Century Company, 1928), pp. 516-517.
^Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crisis, pp. 2 07-2 08.
^^Ibid. , p. 210-
^*Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 66-67
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at which he decided, with the full backing of the cabinet, to 
send a "sufficient body of mobile troops...to locate and 
disperse or capture the band or bands that attacked 
Columbus.Outside the meeting room, the reporters wanted a 
statement. President Wilson, speaking before thoroughly 
planning the United States' goals, said that "An adequate 
force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single 
object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays.""® 
After the cabinet meeting. Secretary of War Newton Diehl 
Baker, who held a special grudge against Villa because the 
raid took place on the day he was sworn in to his new office, 
made his way to the office of General Hugh Scott. Although 
Baker was an open pacifist, he held the general in great 
respect and listened carefully to his advice. When Baker told 
Scott that he wanted the army to catch Villa, the general 
pointed out the great problems of sending the army to catch 
one man. Villa himself could always take a train to the south 
of Mexico or even to South America. The true target for the 
United States Army was Villa's army. The new mission statement 
did not mention the capture of Villa, but instead focused on 
the army that attacked Columbus as the target for the United
’̂Newton D. Baker, "Enclosure I, Statement for Press," in Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 36:284.
40,lA Press Release," 10 March 1916, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 36:287.
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States Army.'** Although the American soldiers at Columbus had 
shown themselves equal to the task of fighting the Mexican 
raiders, mounting an expedition into Mexico, while 
simultaneously guarding the entire border, would soon expose 
the shortcomings of the army.
On the same day Baker and Scott set the goals of the 
expedition, the Secretary of War sent a telegram to General 
Frederick Funston, the Commanding General of the Southern 
Department at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In it. Baker outlined 
the goals he and Scott had agreed on earlier in the day. The 
message also named Brigadier General John Pershing as the head 
of the expeditionary force,
General Pershing was born on 13 September 1860, in a 
small town in Missouri. Entering West Point at age 22, he 
graduated 13th out of seventy-seven in his class, although 
most of the students looked to him as their leader. After 
graduation he became a cavalry officer and took part in the 
final Indian campaigns of the southwest.'*^ Later, while 
running the R.O.T.C. program at the University of Nebraska, he 
acquired a reputation for severe, but fair, discipline.'*'* He 
also led the 10th Cavalry of African-American soldiers in
‘**Pershing Papers, Box 372.
'*̂ Newton D. Baker, "Memorandum for Adjutant General," 10 March 1916. Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 36:285.
^^andiver. Black Jack, pp. 47-104.
^Ibid., pp. 105-132.
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Montana for two years and took part in the Spanish-American 
War campaign in Cuba. After the war, he participated in the 
campaigns against the Moros in the southern Philippines. There 
his coolness under fire, sound thought, and honor, eventually 
earned him the respect of the Moros.Pershing knew how to 
act in a delicate political atmosphere, as well as how to 
provide leadership to American forces on a difficult mission.
Pershing married the daughter of Senator Francis E. 
Warren of Wyoming, who was chairman of the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee, in 1905. Theodore Roosevelt attended the 
ceremony. Later, when the president promoted him from captain 
to brigadier general over the heads of some 909 senior 
officers, many of those senior officers charged favoritism.^
With the advent of problems on the Mexican border in 
1913, Pershing received orders to return to the United States. 
After settling his wife, three daughters, and a son at the 
Presidio of San Francisco, he went to Fort Bliss, at El Paso, 
Texas, to take command of the 6th and 16th Infantry of the 8th 
Brigade. In the summer of 1915, Pershing learned that all his 
family except his six-year-old son had died in a fire at the 
Presidio. After the tragedy, the army became his only 
existence.
Pershing assumed command of the Punitive Expedition, U.S.
'‘̂ Ibid., pp. 315-316. 
^Ibid., p. 390. 
'‘■'Ibid., pp. 592-598.
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Army, on 11 March 1916. His orders gave him authority to take 
only as large a force as needed to pursue and disperse Villa's 
band and to protect his own lines of communication.'** Further 
instructions prevented him from using the Mexican rail system 
or entering cities. From the forces available— that is, those 
within the continental United States— Pershing assembled two 
columns for the expedition. The first column, to enter Mexico 
from the east, included the 13th Cavalry, the 6th and 16th 
Infantry Regiments, 1st Battalion, 4th Field artillery, with 
an attached battery from the 6th Field Artillery, and the 1st 
Aero Squadron, with 8 airplanes. The west column consisted of 
the 7th Cavalry, the 10th Cavalry, and one battery of the 6th 
Field Artillery.**® Pershing also brought elements from the 
Signal Corps with radios to provide communications between his 
columns.
Although the United States government insisted that the 
expedition would operate with the cooperation of the 
Constitutionalist government and with the greatest respect for 
Mexican sovereignty. President Carranza never gave his 
approval. On 14 March, American intelligence reported that the 
commander of the Mexican border town of Palomas would use 
force against an American incursion. Although the Mexican 
commander offered no resistance when the expedition arrived.
***Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 71. 
**®Ibid., pp. 73-74.
Pershing Papers, Box 372.
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his threat reminded the Americans that the expedition would 
not be traveling through friendly country.
While in Mexico, the expedition tried to maintain good 
relations with the Mexican people. However, incidents occurred 
that sorely tested Pershing as a field commander in a highly 
political situation. On 12 April, an American cavalry 
detachment of two troops, under the command of Major Tompkins, 
entered the city of Parra1 expecting to find food and forage. 
Instead they became the target of the anti-American wrath of 
the city's residents.^^ When the local Carrancista commander 
lost control of his forces and they joined the attack on the 
Americans, he tried to help the Americans out of the city. 
Before extricating themselves, the Americans lost two men to 
Mexican bullets. The Americans, however, in their first real 
test of discipline under fire in Mexico, maintained cohesion 
and were able to withdraw.
Unable to catch Villa, the expedition evolved into a 
police action, with the goal of destroying of Villa's army. To 
accomplish this, Pershing divided the area of operations into 
five districts. Each district had a numbered cavalry 
responsible to track down and destroy Villista elements.^’
On the plains of the American west, or in the jungles of
267.
‘̂Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 74.
®^Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 266-
53Pershing Papers, Box 372.
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the Philippines, the army could conduct this type of operation 
in relative obscurity. Mexico, however, remained a sovereign 
nation, and Pershing could not always act as he saw best.^ By 
June, Carranza's troops began to assume positions that 
threatened Pershing's lines of communications. With tensions 
high between the Americans and the Mexican federal troops, a 
clash became probable. At Carrizal, open fighting between 
American soldiers and Mexican federal troops became the 
hardest fight for the Americans in Mexico.
The incident began when an American cavalry force on a 
reconnaissance mission, under the command of Captain Charles 
T. Boyd, tried to force its way through the town. The local 
Carrancista commander refused permission to let them through. 
Boyd hoped to teach the Mexicans a lesson, and perhaps gain a 
little glory, but instead led his men into defeat.^ Against 
Mexican machine guns and superior numbers, the Americans began 
to fall back. A retreat turned into a rout when Boyd, followed 
by other officers, was killed.Luckily, the Carrancistas did 
not leave the town to completely destroy the American force. 
Patrols dispatched by Pershing picked up small bands of the 
survivors wandering the Mexican plain for days after the
^Ibid.
^^Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 280-281.
^Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 305.
’’ibid.
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battle. The Americans suffered a total of forty-four 
casualties to the Mexican's ninety-three.
After Carrizal, the American force did not venture beyond 
150 miles south of the border. The chance of catching Villa 
himself in that area was slim. Although discouraged at the 
politically imposed stalemate, Pershing used this time to 
train his many green recruits. The training in Mexico proved 
to be invaluable to the army in less than a year. Pershing 
later credited his success in Europe to training in a war of 
movement received in Mexico.
While Pershing chased Villa's army into Chihuahua, 
another group of Mexican raiders decided to attack the towns 
of Glenn Springs, and Boquillas, Texas, near the Big Bend of 
the Rio Grande. On the night of 5-6 May, 1916, about one 
hundred Mexicans sacked the small town of Glenn Springs and 
killed a few of the American soldiers stationed there. 
Although hopelessly outnumbered, the soldiers managed to make 
the Mexicans work for their plunder. The Mexicans finally 
burned the roof of the building from which the soldiers fought 
and shot the Americans as they fled from the flames.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the raiders left Glenn 
Springs and headed down river about twelve miles to Boquillas, 
Texas, where another group of raiders had been busy since ten
ssPershing Papers, Box 372.
®’John J. Pershing, Mv Experiences in the World War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 1:11.
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that morning. From there the two groups headed back to Mexico 
with plunder and captives. Overburdened with goods, the 
Mexicans commandeered a truck. When the poor road conditions 
prevented the truck from keeping pace with the horse-borne 
men, the captured Americans operating the truck were able to 
overpower their Mexican guards and head back to the United 
States.
After this raid, two companies of the 8th Cavalry from 
Fort Bliss entered Mexico to search for the raiders. With 100 
men, one forage truck, a pair of Ford sedans, and a Cadillac 
touring car, the new detachment mirrored Pershing's main 
effort, only on a smaller scale. The expedition soon ran into 
the same problems with transportation that the raiders had. 
The cars and the truck fell miles behind the horse cavalry. 
Except as a way to haul grain for the horses, the motorized 
transport held little advantage on the rutted dirt roads of 
Mexico. After two weeks and two hundred miles, the tired and 
thirsty troopers returned to Texas after taking five prisoners 
and leaving behind a few dead bandits.
News of the new raids placed an even larger burden on the 
already overextended United States Army. General Scott sent 
Secretary Baker a message stating that at least 150,000 more 
troops were needed to protect the border. In response, the 
president called out the National Guard of Texas, Arizona, and 
New Mexico. The small numbers of National Guardsmen
®^ason. The Great Pursuit, pp. 167-181
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responding, however, failed to solve the problem. Arizona 
could call up only 907 Guardsmen, New Mexico 972, and Texas 
3,381. Traditionally devoted to Combat Arms— branches whose 
mission was fighting rather than support— the Guard units were 
comprised mostly of infantry, with two batteries of field 
artillery and one cavalry squadron.^’ The combat arms carried 
more prestige, so when groups or influential individuals had 
formed companies of organized militia, they almost always 
chose a combat arms branch. Also, for the traditional uses for 
militia— suppression of a strike or riot close to home— large 
support functions would be of little use. On the border the 
National Guard learned that if it was to become part of the 
army, it needed to provide more support units for extended 
operations.
In response to the dismal showing of Guardsmen from the 
border states, on 18 June President Wilson called out the 
entire National Guard of the United States for service on the 
Mexican border. This brought the total of Guardsmen in federal 
service on the border to over 110,000 by late summer. These 
augmented the over 3 5,000 Regular Army soldiers that Secretary 
Baker ordered to the border in June. The effort on the Mexican
®‘John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National 
Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), p. 151.
“ibid. President Wilson called out the National Guard 
through the state governors. The total Guardsmen mobilized was 
123,605 enlisted and 8,589 officers. This was 97,350 men short 
of the Guard's authorized war strength, but only 4,083 short of its peacetime strength.
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border left the continental United States without any troops 
to spare. For practical purposes, all troops not in the 
Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, or anywhere else overseas, were 
on the border or in Mexico.
Although forbidden by law from crossing the Rio Grande, 
the National Guardsmen benefitted from border duties. Along 
with the experience of camp life and adjusting to full time 
service, more important lessons were learned. Officers learned 
supply could often take more time and effort than all other 
duties. The Guardsmen also learned that membership in their 
local militia company could sometimes mean more than a weekly 
lost evening or call-up for a local problem."^^Even so. General 
Scott thought the National Guard would still need six months 
of training to be combat-ready.̂
Meanwhile, the Regular Army was learning many of the same 
lessons regarding supply and transport. However, they operated 
deep in Mexico, where communication problems and political 
difficulties added to the problems. The aero squadron— the 
first American military use of airplanes— performed poorly and 
well below expectations. Vastly under-funded compared to 
European air forces, the American Army could bring only eight 
Jennies for reconnaissance into Mexico. Mechanical problems 
and reoccurring troubles with cracked propellers dropped the
63/^Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 287- 288.
“Mahon, Historv of the Militia, p. 152.
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number of usable aircraft to two by 20 April.Later the army 
sent these back to Columbus. The poor showing of American air 
power in the Mexican campaign helped destroy the notion that 
the army needed only a few planes.
Other problems surfaced. Many cavalry horses died from 
the trip to the border. Pushed into service without a proper 
quarantine or acclimatization, the horses fell victim to the 
Mexican heat. The sudden change in diet increased their 
susceptibility to disease.“ The McClellen saddle, a sort of 
miniature hammock the cavalry used, caused many of the men to 
complain of back pains after long days of riding. The saddle 
also made carrying a saber and rifle awkward. As a result, 
many of the soldiers discarded their sabar, which they found 
obsolete anyway. However, sabers and even horses, as the 
European armies were discovering, had passed from usefulness 
in combat. The machine gun and rifle forced the soldier in 
combat to seek cover, rather than present a target high on 
horseback. Denied the use of Mexican railroads, the army 
continued to rely on animal transport for moving men and 
supplies across the plains of Chihuahua. However, every horse 
or mule became another mouth to feed. Gasoline was cheaper
*®Pershing Papers, Box 372.
^Clyde E. Hawkins, "What Horse for the Cavalry," Journal 
of the United States Cavalrv Association 28 (July, 1917), 100.
‘̂ Charles D. Rhodes, "Notes on Cavalry Equipment," Journal of the United States Cavalrv Association 28 (July, 1917) , 82- 90.
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than oats. Although the horse would be important for army 
logistics in Mexico, its replacement in that role had surfaced 
in the motor vehicles brought to Mexico with the expedition.
The automobile made its debut with the United States Army 
during the Punitive Expedition. Pershing brought six as staff 
cars. American truck manufacturers also began sending trucks 
for the army's use. The army quickly learned which domestic 
truck manufacturers produced a reliable product. However, the 
new Jeffrey Quads, Whites, Packards, and Locomobiles needed 
experienced drivers, few of which existed within the army.** 
Drivers had to be trained. Although the trucks were originally 
intended for logistics, soldiers quickly found new uses for 
them such as troop movements and reconnaissance. The limits of 
wheeled vehicles became apparent as well. The trucks also 
showed the necessity for improved roads. Most roads soon 
became impassible from ruts. With few good roads in Mexico, 
the army had to build many of its own roads, greatly delaying 
the impact of the trucks.
Despite the constant need to adapt to new technology, 
some soldiers found change difficult to accept. Although the 
saber proved as useless in Mexico, at least one professional 
soldier still championed it. While still on the Mexican 
expedition. Second Lieutenant Patton published an article
**Vandiver, Black Jack, p. 612
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defending the saber in the cavalrv Journal.*̂ To Patton, the 
lack of use for the saber in Mexico reflected only the nature 
of that particular campaign, and in no way foreshadowed any 
new development. To Patton, the lack of news from the European 
war on cavalry operations, which to him were synonymous with 
the saber, reflected only the reporters' lack of knowledge in 
military matters. Deeply enamored with the French cult of 
elan, Patton urged the continued reliance on the saber to give 
the cavalry the glory it needed to perform its mission. 
Clearly Patton had not yet met the tank.
The problems on the border caused by the Mexican 
Revolution gave the army the opportunity to try other new 
ideas. An exercise conducted on the Texas side of the border 
on 6 October 1916, began the United States Army's attempt to 
find the proper role for motor vehicles in combat.^® With 
fifty Regular Army and National Guard officers watching, the 
army conducted a series of exercises to see if truck-borne 
infantry could overcome a retreating enemy. Aside from basic 
findings such as the need to mount a machine gun on every 
vehicle in case of ambush, the exercise was part of the long 
process of replacing the horse with machines. Although the 
ultimate finding of the exercise was the usefulness of trucks
^George S. Patton Jr., "A Defense of the Saber,” Journal of the United States Cavalrv Association 27 (July 1916), 48- 50.
^^Brigadier General James Parker, "Cavalry and Auto Trucks," Journal of the United States Cavalrv Association 27 (July 1916), 349-360.
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for supply of horse-mounted cavalry, in Europe the movement of 
supplies became the last mission for the horse in modern war, 
as tanks and trucks slowly proved more efficient on the 
battlefield. The United States Army had already discovered the 
limits of the horse in Mexico.
The experiences of the American Expeditionary Force in 
Mexico altered the army. General Pershing, as well as other 
leaders, gained valuable experience of handling large bodies 
of men in a delicate political environment.^* Both the 
practical and mechanical problems of motor vehicles became 
apparent, as did the inadequacy of America's air power.
Perhaps most important, the government saw the inadequacy 
of the National Guard as then structured. The long debate over 
the relationship between the Regular Army and the nation's 
second line of defense set the parameters for potential change 
and suggested remedies for potential problems, but it failed 
to spur action. The hypothetical threats raised during the 
preparedness debate could not bring the government or the army 
to address the weaknesses in the Regular Army or National 
Guard. Problems on the Mexican border, however, presented a 
very real problem. The Mexican border crisis forced the United 
States to alter fundamentally the relationship between state 
forces and the Regular Army.
By February 1917, Germany had pushed Mexico off the front
’*Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 294-295.
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pages of American newspapers. With Pershing largely successful 
in his attempt to rid northern Mexico of Villista elements, 
and with the growing threat of war against the Central Powers, 
the president pulled the expedition out of M e x i c o . B y  then 
the remaining Villistas and the Mexican federal government 
under Carranza had again taken arms against each other. The 
internal Mexican fighting made an alliance between Mexico and 
Germany unlikely and enabled the United States to mobilize 
against the Central Powers without fear for its southern 
border.
72Ibid, pp. 293-294.
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IV. Adoption of the National Defense Act of 1916
As the bulk of the Regular Army and National Guard 
learned its lessons in the heat of the American Southwest and 
in northern Mexico, Congress began to create a new law that 
would better allow the army to respond to the changes in its 
mission since the era of the Founding Fathers. The final 
product, the National Defense Act of 1916, bore the imprint of 
the preparedness debate, the experience in Mexico, the 
lobbying power of the National Guard Officers Association, and 
the ghost of Emory Upton. Once the Act became law, the 
original concept of the relationship between the Regular Army 
and Organized Militia— supplanted by the National Guard— was 
fundamentally changed.
At the start of the twentieth century, partisans of 
reform grappled with the problem of how to create a military 
force that would be competent in wartime yet not be dangerous 
to liberty in peacetime. The United States Volunteers, not 
specified in the Constitution, had been the vehicle to expand 
the military during wartime for a century.* However, the
‘Volunteer Act of 1861. Thirty-seventh Congress. Sess. I Ch. 9.
69
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system had serious pitfalls. The Sand Creek Massacre, fought 
by the "Bloody Third" Colorado Cavalry of US Volunteers, 
illustrated the drawbacks of using 100 day recruits to wage 
war. John J. Chivington, a political ally of the territorial 
governor, led the Third Colorado. Recruited for the specific 
purpose of fighting Indians during the Civil War, the Third 
attacked Black Kettles's band of Cheyennes, which had already 
surrendered. When the Coloradans were done, "some two hundred 
Cheyenne corpses, about two-thirds women and children, 
littered the valley of Sand C r e e k . H u n g r y  for glory, the 
short-term recruits behaved like men playing soldier, rather 
than as true soldiers.
Following the Spanish-American War, military planners 
realized that the system needed change. However, with Theodore 
Roosevelt and his Volunteer Rough Riders receiving popular 
credit for the defeat of Spain, no one wanted to hear about 
the Regular Army units, especially the units of black 
soldiers, that cleared the way for his famous charge. 
Americans retained their traditional disdain for Regulars and 
continued to champion the amateur soldiers. When the Regulars 
were also black, they became invisible to the public. The 
concept of the war-time Volunteer as the real military 
strength of the republic remained entrenched in popular 
imagination, if not in fact.
^Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American 
West 1846-1890 (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 89- 93.
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Americans in 1916, no less than their predecessors in 
1789, tended to distrust a large standing army and to place 
great faith in the civilians who took up arms when war began. 
The Minutemen of Lexington and Concord so captured the pubic 
imagination that many forgot that General Washington had to 
assemble, train, and maintain the Continental Army of regulars 
in order to win independence from Britain. After the war, 
Americans convinced themselves that a mythical citizen- 
soldiery won the war rather than accept that the republic owed 
a great debt to the professional soldiers for securing 
independence.̂
Although the concept of United States Volunteers captured 
the public's imagination, the decades following the Civil War 
witnessed a resurgence of interest in organized militia. Many 
believed that the great casualties in the Civil War reflected 
the relative inexperience of the Volunteer units, and more 
particularly that of their officers. Men died needlessly until 
officers learned the trade of war. Advocates of the militia 
saw the solution in organized companies of militia that 
drilled regularly in peacetime and which could then assist the 
Regular Army in war.*
^Royster, A Revolutionary People at War. As part of his 
basic thesis, Royster argues that revolutionary rhetoric of 
the nation-in-arms failed to arouse the American people for 
the prolonged war against Britain, forcing leaders to rely on the Continental Army.
*John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 108-114.
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Given the need for organized units and training, the 
resurgent organized militia— or as it was increasingly called. 
National Guard— maintained in every state, began to wrest from 
the Volunteers the official role as the nation's second line 
of defense. The Guard already had units in existence. 
Moreover, unlike partisans of the Volunteers, advocates of the 
militia had a strong Constitutional argument. Tracing their 
ancestry to the 1630s, the militia far antedated the United 
States Army. The Founding Fathers considered the militia and 
the army as separate institutions. Article I, section 10, of 
the Constitution stated that "no state shall, without the 
consent of Congress...keep troops...", but in the oft quoted 
second amendment, the Constitution guaranteed the right of the 
states to keep "[a] well regulated militia...". However, 
Article II, section 3 established the president as the 
Commander-in Chief of the militia when in federal service. 
Clearly, the framers intended that the militia would be called 
into federal service when needed.
The Regular Army, however, had little but contempt for 
the militia. Although not published until January 1904, copies 
of Major General Emory Upton's book. The Militarv Policv of 
the United States, had been passed around the War Department 
for years before publication.^ Regular Army officers quoted 
Upton's book as gospel. The book reflected Upton's infatuation 
with the Prussian military. The Uptonites believed that state
^Ambrose, Upton and the Armv. pp. 151-154
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control of militia would always make it useless as a reserve 
force. To Upton's disciples, the answer was a federally 
controlled reserve force, independent of state meddling. The 
organized militia, even if called 'National Guard,' was still 
fundamentally a state force and therefore worthless to the 
Regular Army.®
The Regulars had a good argument. Until the Militia Act 
of 1903, the federal army and militia units had little 
standardization. Each state, territory, and the District of 
Columbia, had its own uniforms, training programs, and 
organization. To integrate this polyglot of militia into 
federal service was practically impossible. The Militia Act of 
1903--called "the Dick Act" after the bill's sponsor, Charles 
F. Dick— sought to correct this.^ The Dick Act was the first 
exercise of power over the militia by Congress since 1792. The 
Militia Act of 1792 required all males between 18 and 4 5 years 
of age to arm themselves and attend an annual muster.® Most 
people ignored the law, as did the state and federal 
governments.’ By the time of the War of 1812, the Jeffersonian
®Ibid., p. 154.
^Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, p. 26. The 
bill's sponsor was General Charles F. Dick, Chairman of the 
Senate Militia Committee, president of the National Guard 
Association, and Commanding General of the Ohio National Guard.
®Militia Act of 1792. Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 33. sec. 1.
’Mahon, Historv of the Militia and National Guard, pp. 81-83.
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ideal of the general militia of all able-bodied male citizens 
had been abandoned.After the Civil War, however, local 
groups, usually including many veterans, began to take militia 
training seriously." Although still called militia in most 
states, these constituted the real beginning of the National 
Guard. The Dick Act gave official recognition to the term 
'National Guard' for the organized militia of the states. At 
the time, most militia units drilled one evening a week, 
although attendance varied widely, and some units seldom 
drilled at all. The Dick Act authorized federal funds for at 
least two mandatory drills per month.*’ Guard units had to 
hold a minimum number of target practices every year. ** The 
1903 Act also required militia units to spend short periods in 
the field annually.*’ Each state's militia had to follow the 
Regular Army in organization, equipment, and discipline.** The 
planners hoped the changes would mold the National Guard into
***Cress, Citizens in Arms, p. 176.
**Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp. 15-16.
‘̂ Militia Act of 1903. Fifty-seventh Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 196. sec 1.
*’lbid., sec. 18. This part of the act stipulated that 
each unit would hold not less than 24 drills per year. Drill normally consisted of a weekly two-hour period on a weekday evening.
*̂ *Ibid.
*’lbid., The annual training period had to include at least five days of field training.
**Ibid., sec. 3.
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an effective reserve force that the federal army could use.
The Militia Act of 1903, however, contained many clauses 
that severely weakened it. state governors retained the right 
to authorize or to deny their state's unit for federal 
service. Even with the governor's consent, individual 
Guardsmen needed to volunteer for federal service; they could 
not be drafted against their will. In addition, federal 
service could not extend beyond nine months.** Finally, no 
federal agency, including the army, had the authority to 
remove militia officers, no matter how incompetent they 
were.*’ Amendments to the Militia Act of 1903 in 1908 gave the 
president the right to prescribe the length of time militia 
units could spend in federal service, although individual 
Guardsmen could not be forced to serve past existing 
enlistments or commissions.“
The changes of 1908 further provided that the National 
Guard could be ordered for service "either within or without
‘̂ Gene Gurney, A Pictorial History of the United States 
Armv (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1966), p. 310. However, section 7 of the 1903 act seems to dispute this. But the Militia Act of 1908, Sixtieth Congress, session II. chapter 204, sec 43, supports the notion of federal control only at the governor's consent.
**Militia Act of 1903, sec. 5.
*’lbid., sec. 8. The law stated that only militia officers 
could serve on courts-martials for officers and men of the 
National Guard for offenses while in federal service.
“̂Militia Act of 1908. Sixtieth Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 
204. sec. 5. This amendment gave the president the power to 
keep militiamen in federal service as long as the president 
required rather than the nine month limit of the Act of 1903.
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the Territory of the United States. However in 1912, the 
Attorney General ruled that sending National Guard units 
outside of United States territory violated the 
Constitution.^^ This led to incidents such as one in which the 
Virginia National Guard, in federal service on the Mexican 
border in 1916, would ride their mounts up to the Mexican bank 
of the Rio Grande by the town of Matamoros, but not would 
leave the river.“
In 1910, the United States Army General Staff finally 
developed a plan to integrate the state militia into the 
federal army during national emergences. At that time, the 
Regular Army was scattered throughout the continental United 
States in battalions occupying some forty-nine posts left from 
the days of the Indian Wars.^ Most of the posts held little 
or no military value and remained active for the economic 
benefit of the local community. In addition, the War
‘̂Militia Act of 1908, sec 5.
^̂ Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United 
States Advising the President and Heads of Departments in Relation to Their Official Duties. George Kearney, ed. 
(Washington: GPO, 1913), 29:322-329. In a reply to an inquiry 
from the Secretary of War, Attorney General George W. 
Wickersham ruled that the militia, regardless of its name, 
could only be used for the constitutionally sanctioned 
purposes: suppression of insurrection, repelling of invasion, 
or execution of laws. The militia could only leave United States territory in pursuit of an invading army.
^John Listman, "Old Dominion's Wartime Maneuvers Along 
the Rio Grande," The National Guard Magazine 46 (May 1992), 
45.
^William Addleman Ganoe, The Historv of the United States 
Armv (Ashton Maryland; Eric Lunberg, 1964), p. 68.
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Department posted a large minority of the Regular Army in 
America's newly acquired overseas possessions: The Canal Zone, 
Puerto Rico, Hawai'i, Guam, Alaska, and the Philippines. For 
internal police duties, such as Indian uprisings and labor 
unrest, this arrangement worked. But as Wounded Knee receded 
into the past, and the Spanish-American War brought America 
into the first ranks of world power, this arrangement became 
a liability.
For an army to be effective against another army, it must 
be concentrated. Toward that end, the General Staff developed 
a plan for the Regular Army to form three divisions.“ The 
General Staff hoped that the changes would allow larger 
formations to train together. This plan failed due to lack of 
funds to implement it. In 1912, the army developed a plan for 
the Regular Army to form four permanent divisions and the 
National Guard to form twelve divisions.“ However this was 
only an administrative change; no troops were moved and the 
army remained scattered in small posts.
In 1911, before the first plan was fully implemented, 
fear of trouble on the Mexican border caused by the revolution 
forced the War Department to develop an alternative plan. 
General Wood hastily formed a "maneuver division" of Regular 
Army units and sent it to the border. This mobilization
145.
“ibid., p. 437.
^*^ahon, Historv of the Militia and National Guard, p .
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demonstrated the weakness of the army. None of the units 
arrived at the border fully armed or at full strength. The 
army stripped units not part of the maneuver division to fill 
those that went. Assembly took longer than planned, and the 
War Department soon disbanded the division.^ In February of 
1913, a mobilization on the Texas border by the Regular Army's 
Second Division met with more success due to reforms in 
planning made after the fiasco in 1911.^®
In the amendment to the Dick Act in 1914, the National 
Guard Officers Association received designation for the Guard 
as the nation's second line of defense. Guardsmen still had to 
volunteer for federal service as individuals, but the 
president had to accept any unit with over three-quarters of 
its members volunteering. Guardsmen had to volunteer as 
individuals due to the constitutional barriers of using 
militia beyond the borders of the United States. In wartime, 
the president had to accept all National Guard units that 
volunteered before he could accept any US Volunteers.^’
By 1915, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison developed 
a plan for a reserve force to replace the National Guard as 
the country's main augmentation of the Regular Army. Convinced 
that state control of Guard units would always hamper their
^Weigley, Historv of United States Armv. pp. 334-335. 
2*lbid.
^Volunteer Act of 1914. Sixty-third Congress. Sess. I. Ch, 71. sec. 3.
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usefulness. Garrison planned a federal military reserve that 
he called, in a political move to link it with patriotism and 
the Founding Fathers, a Continental Army. This force was to 
have between 400,000 and 500,000 men.^® Basically, Garrison's 
plan copied George Washington's plan for a federal militia.
President Wilson supported this plan at first. During a 
speech on 4 November 1915, the President called for a moderate 
increase of the Regular Army, a strengthened National Guard, 
and a 400,000 man Continental Army.^‘ Completely under federal 
control, members of the Continental Army were to be civilian 
volunteers who trained in summer camps. The plan met with 
bitter resistance from the National Guard Officers 
Association, which correctly feared it as an attempt to 
shuffle the Guard into obscurity. Many Southern Congressmen 
feared that blacks would join in large numbers and so opposed 
the idea. When Garrison testified before the House
committee, he admitted that many of the men for the 
Continental Army would most likely come from the National 
Guard, but as the Guard and Regular Army could not recruit to 
strength, the government would probably need to draft soldiers 
for the new reserve. This killed the plan for the immediate 
future.Although not included in the 1916 Act, the concept
“̂Clifford, Citizens in Arms, p. 118.
’‘Ibid., p. 123.
’̂ Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, p. 51 
’’Ibid., p. 125-127.
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of the Continental Army was later realized as the Array Reserve 
after World War II.
Another idea from the period, which did become part of 
the Act, was the Officer Training Camps movement. From the 
summer of 1913, the army had conducted a series of Student 
Military Training Camps. Students from the nation's colleges 
and universities spent four or more weeks, depending on the 
year, learning basic military skills. Each student paid for 
his uniform and meals. After completing the course, his 
training with the army finished, each "veteran" was expected 
to spread the gospel of military preparedness.̂
Related to the summer camps was military instruction at 
land-grant colleges. The Morrill Act of 1863 required that all 
the land-grant colleges teach courses in military tactics.” 
Some, such as Norwich University in Vermont and the Virginia 
Military Institute, conducted highly credible programs. At the 
majority of schools, however, the training was considered a 
boring joke by the students and the equivalent of exile by the 
officer-instructors. Moreover, the War Department kept no 
record of students with military training once these students 
had graduated from college,” Major General Leonard Wood, the 
army Chief of Staff, who earned his commission through the
”lbid.
”Morrill Act. Thirty-seventh Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 130, sec. 4.
”Gene M. Lyons, and John W. Masland, "The Origins of the 
ROTC," Militarv Affairs 23 (Spring 1959), 1-12.
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Medical Corps and not West Point# began to agitate for 
cooperation between the War and Interior Departments for 
standardization of the instruction at land-grant colleges. He 
also hoped to give provisional commissions, what today would 
be called Reserve Commissions, to the honor graduates, who, 
after a year of active training in the Regular Army, would 
form an officers reserve.
In 1916, as a result of the shortcomings exposed by the 
response to Villa's raids and the threat of war in Europe, 
Congress passed the National Defense Act. This was the last 
restructuring of the military before entry into the Great War. 
Through it, the government tried to correct many of the 
shortcomings of the Militia Act of 1903. Under the Act of 
1903, the status of the National Guard remained unclear. 
Although it was the first reserve of the army, legally it 
remained militia and was therefore limited to the territorial 
United States. The experience of the Guardsmen reacting to the 
raids by Mexican revolutionaries highlighted this problem. The 
National Defense Act of 1916 fundamentally altered the 
relationship of the organized militia, the National Guard, 
when called into federal service. The new law defined the Army 
of the United States as consisting of the Regular Army, the 
Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted 
Reserve Corps, and the National Guard when in federal Service. 
In truth, only the Regular Army and the National Guard 
actually existed. The combat arms of the Regular Army
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consisted of 64 regiments of infantry, 26 regiments of 
cavalry, 21 regiments of field artillery, and a coast 
artillery corps. The total authorized enlisted force for the 
Regular Army consisted of a peacetime strength of not more 
than 175,000 men, not counting the Philippine Scouts, Medical 
Department, Quartermaster, signal corps, and unassigned 
recruits.The president could augment the Regular Army with 
the organized state militia for the duration of the national 
emergency as in the changes of 1908.^* Also, the 1916 act 
brought the Puerto Rico Regiment of Infantry of the United 
States Army closer to the Regular Army. The organization, 
grades, and numbers of men and officers had to conform to 
Regular Army standards.^’
Under the 1916 Act, the training camps of General Wood 
received official support from Congress. The law specifically 
gave the Secretary of War the authorization to hold the camps. 
The federal government assumed the cost of uniforms, 
transportation, subsistence, and equipment for the trainees.'*® 
During the Great War, these camps provided the majority of the 
line officers for the greatly expanded army. Candidates
^^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 2.
’*Ibid. , sec 3. This was done by requiring all officers 
and men of the National Guard to take a new oath swearing to 
defend the United States as well as their home state. Upon federalization, all Guardsmen were discharged from the 
National Guard and became Volunteers in the federal army.
’̂ibid., sec. 21.
^Ibid., sec. 24.
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underwent an intensive ninety days of training to prepare them 
as officers in a specific branch. These camps were the direct 
forbear of the modern Officer Candidate School."*
The new law also gave the president authorization to 
continue the Reserve Officers Training Corps— R.O.T.C— at all 
land-grant colleges."^ Perhaps more important, the Act gave 
the president the authority to expand the R.O.T.C. program to 
non-Land-Grant schools."* Reflecting another idea of General 
Wood, the Act instituted the practice of provisional 
commissions for new officers who were not graduates of the 
United States Military Academy. Under the Act, honor graduates 
from R.O.T.C. programs could serve on active duty for two 
years with a provisional commission. If a holder of such a 
commission proved competent after two years, he could receive 
a permanent commission and remain on active duty.""
Section 57 of the Act reasserted the right of the federal 
government to conscript into the military. Wilson claimed that 
when the Republic declared war, the citizens had in effect all 
volunteered for military service."* The new law put this idea
"‘Ernest R. Dupuy and Trever N. Dupuy, Militarv Heritage 
of America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p. 358.
"^Ibid. , sec. 40-52. Section 52 gave the authority for 
R.O.T.C. graduates to spend six months, not the full year 
envisioned by General Woods, on active duty for training.
"*Ibid., secs. 40-42.
""ibid., sec. 23.
"^Clifford, The citizen Soldiers, p. 49.
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into legal form. "All able bodied male citizens of the United 
States” and those intending to become citizens, between the 
ages of 18 and 45, were declared to comprise the militia of 
the United States. Men not in the Regular Army, or their 
state's organized militia (National Guard) or naval militia, 
formed the so-called unorganized militia.^ This meant, that 
as residents of a democracy whose elected officials declared 
either a war or other emergency, they were eligible for 
military service. By electing the men who declared war, the 
population already volunteered for active military service.
Another section standardized the number of Guardsmen in 
each state. Within one year of passage of the act, each state 
was to have 200 enlisted men for each senator and 
representative that the state sent to Congress. The president 
received the authority to decide the number of Guardsmen each 
territory and the District of Columbia could have. After the 
first year, the plan called for the number of Guardsmen to 
increase by fifty percent each year until the number of 
enlisted Guardsmen reached at least 800 per Congressman in 
each sta t e . A s  the Guard units were already under strength, 
the possibility of recruiting to higher strengths was not 
likely. However, with the United States formally at peace. 
Congress hoped to provide a reserve force without resorting to 
the conscription implicit in the plan for the Continental
'^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 57. 
^^Ibid. , sec. 62.
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Army.
The new law also integrated the National Guard into the 
War Department. The army had created a National Militia Board 
to advise the army on militia matters in 1908.^* The new law 
superseded this, moving militia affairs up to bureau level. 
The Chief of this new Militia Bureau was also ex-officio a 
member of the General Staff Corps.Recognizing the need for 
closer relations between the Regular Army and the National 
Guard, the new law provided for 822 extra officers and 100 
extra sergeants from the combat arms of the Regular Army to 
serve one-year tours with the National Guard as instructors.*® 
In a move that allowed the War Department better to integrate 
the National Guard into war plans, the president received the 
authority to decide which types of Guard units states were to 
maintain. Prior to this. National Guard companies adopted 
whatever branch they fancied. After the Act of 1916, the army 
could decide whether a Guard unit would be cavalry, artillery, 
supply, or whatever the army needed.
The Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve 
Corps existed only on paper. Only sixteen enlisted men joined
““ibid., sec. 81. This section states that the National 
Militia Board was created by the Act of 27 May, 1908, amending 
section 20 of the Act of 21 January 1903.
’̂Ibid.
*®Ibid. , secs. 25, 36. Section 25 covers the extra
officers, and section 3 6 covers the extra sergeants.
*'lbid., sec. 197.
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the Enlisted Reserve Corps.These reserves differed greatly 
from the Army Reserve of today. Instead of reserve units to 
augment the army during mobilization, the Enlisted Reserve 
Corps was more akin to the modern Individual Ready Reserve— a 
list of trained veterans who could be called back into the 
Regular Army in times of crisis. The proposed Enlisted Reserve 
Corps was not a corps at all. Instead, it consisted of 
individual soldiers released early from active duty with 
liability for recall into the Regular Army during 
mobilization.^^ Unlike the modern Army Reserve, the members of 
the Enlisted reserve Corps did not form any units and did not 
train.
The Officers Reserve Corps filled General Wood's desire 
for a plan to retain the services of college graduates with 
officer training. Graduates of the summer training camps and 
R.O.T.C. would then enter into the Officers Reserve Corps. 
Under the Act, during wartime the reserve officers would serve 
in the Regular Army, and work in support roles such as the 
Quarter Master, staff, and recruit rendezvous and depots. In 
addition, reserve officers were supposed to provide officers 
for the Volunteer units, the old standby.̂  The Volunteer Army 
would consist of large units of either volunteers or 
conscripts enlisted in time of war. The Continental Army idea
^^Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers, p. 10. 
^^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 55. 
^Ibid, sec. 37.
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disappeared.
The response of the Regular Army reflected its 
experiences in Mexico and on the border. The Cavalry Journal 
ran an editorial praising the final compromise b i l l O f  
course, the provisions providing for an increase in the 
cavalry branch brought the highest praise, which it directly 
linked to the "activities of one Pancho Villa."®* It also 
approved of the incorporation of a machine gun troop into each 
regiment of cavalry. Again this showed the influence of the 
experiences of the expeditionary force in Mexico. The Journal 
agreed with the provision to spread the increases in manpower 
over a five year period, because it thought that the quality 
of the army would suffer a from a sudden large increase. In 
reality, of course, an increase larger and more rapid than 
anything dreamed of was less than a year away. At the time, 
however, the Journal feared that the increases would stop 
after the first year. The Journal believed that Congress 
planned only to increase the army for the immediate threat on 
the Mexican border, rather than as a long-term plan for 
increasing the strength of the army.
Democracies, for better or worse, tend to move slowly 
unless an actual emergency arises. During the national debate
®®Editor's Table, "The Army Bill," The Journal of the United States Cavalrv Association 27 (July 1916), 151-154,
®*Ibid. , p. 151.
®^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 24.
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over preparedness. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan 
said that "the president knows that if this country needed a 
million men, and needed them in a day, the call would go out 
at sunrise and the sun would go down on a million men in 
arms."“ Unfortunately, in modern warfare, a million men put 
under arms in a day would be at best an armed rabble, and at 
worst cannon fodder to be slaughtered by professional armies. 
Although unknown to both Congress and the army at the time, 
the American declaration of war on Germany and Austria-Hungary 
was less than a year away and would occur before many of the 
changes took place. The National Defense Act of 1916 did, 
however, lay the basis for the United States to mobilize and 
field over three million men during the year and a half the 
United States was at war with the Central Powers.
58iMerle Eugen Curti, Brvan and World Peace (Northhampton 
Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, Vol.16, no. 3-4,1931), p. 233.
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V. Conclusion
The National Defense Act of 1916, a compromise of various 
needs and interests, fundamentally altered the military 
establishment. What the Civil War was to the increased 
centralization of governmental power, the 1916 Act was to 
military power. State influence in military affairs would 
continue, but the balance had shifted decisively in the 
federal government's favor. The remainder of the twentieth 
century would witness a continuation of the trend solidified 
in 1916.
America's military involvement in the Mexican Revolution, 
the preparedness debate, and the war in Europe, all served to 
convince Americans to abandon the archaic model of national 
defense inherited from the revolutionary generation. The 
Founding Fathers reached a compromise intended to ensure 
defense of the nation without resorting to militarism. The 
result fully satisfied neither the proponents of state 
sovereignty nor advocates of a more centralized republic. 
However the system outlasted its framers. In the pre­
industrialized era, no potential adversary had the ability to 
cross the ocean and attack without lengthy preparation that 
also would have given the United States adequate time to
89
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prepare.
Great Britain, America's traditional enemy throughout 
much of the period before the twentieth century, provided the 
only exception. The War of 1812 amply demonstrated the 
weaknesses of America's defense system, yet the results also 
showed the strengths of the decentralization of the United 
States. The capture and destruction of the capital by Britain 
did not mean victory for Britain. In addition, the army and 
militia occasionally proved adequate for defense. Moreover, 
the refusal of the militia to enter Canada reinforced the idea 
that a citizens' militia prevented adventurism and ensured 
that the military could be used only for defense. Despite the 
limitations in the system, it served the government adequately 
throughout the nineteenth century.
By 1914, however, the nation had changed considerably. 
America's flirtation with imperialism at the turn of the 
century left the army with additional missions far removed 
from the continental United States. With Europe at war and 
direct United States involvement looming as a possibility, the 
whole military establishment found itself overtaxed responding 
to a small raid on the country's southern border. Although the 
changes of 1903 and 1916 did not adequately prepare the army 
for world war, they did overcome the constitutional limits of 
a state-based second line of defense.' In the decade and a
'when the United States entered the Great War, the 
Regular Army provided the 1st through 25th Divisions, the 
National Guard provided 26 through 50, and the remaining
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half between the end of the Spanish-American War, and the 
National Defense Act of 1916, the militia of the colonial 
period evolved into a very different creation.
The modern National Guard replaced both the old militia 
and the Volunteers. With the dual oath or enlistment for 
Guardsmen, the Guard became able to accompany the Regular Army 
in any theater in the world. Although states continued to have 
an influence in their Guard units, that influence waned 
throughout the century. The defeat in federal courts of an 
attempt in 1987-88 by the governors of Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, and other states to prevent their states' 
National Guard units from attending annual training exercises 
in Honduras underscored the point.^ state governments had 
become little more than cheerleaders for their National Guard 
units in federal service. Governors held command over their 
state National Guard only when the unit was not in federal 
service. During the Great War this led to a dilemma: with the 
states' only organized militia— the National Guard— liable for 
service outside the United States, states were left in wartime 
without a force for traditional militia functions. To prevent 
a recurrence of the situation. Congress amended the National 
Defense Act of 1916 during 1940, when the National Guard was
divisions were designated as "National Army." Although the president could accept three Divisions of US Volunteers, 
President Wilson did not exercise this right.
^Patrick Todd Mullins "The Militia Clause, the National 
Guard, and Federalism: A Constitutional Tug of War," Georae 
Washington Law Review 57 (December 1988), 328-329.
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federalized for a year of training. Under the amendment, the 
states received specific permission to form an organized 
militia separate from the National Guard and not subject to 
federal service. This new State Guard would fill the state 
role of the National Guard while the National Guard was in 
federal service.^ Most states created a State Guard during the 
Second World War, while increasingly relying on the new 
institution of the state police during peacetime. Traditional 
militia functions of suppressing riots and maintaining order 
became civil rather than military function.**
The watershed came in the years between the Spanish- 
American War and America's entry into the Great War. Those 
years saw the abandonment of the militia system as inherited 
from the Revolutionary generation and the creation of a new 
system of defense. The National Defense Act of 1916 
established, with only minor modification, the relationship 
between the regular and reserve components of the United 
States Army for the rest of the twentieth century.
^United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, The 
Home Guard. (Washington: GPO, 1944). This report deals with 
the amendment to section 16 of the National Defense Act of 
1916, which allowed states to create a non-National Guard organized militia. Usually referred to as "State Guards," 
units were activated in most states for state duties during the Second World War, and revised as a paper force during the Korean War.
^Little work has been done on the State Guards. The most 
in- depth study is the Historical Evaluation & Research 
Organization's US Home Defense Forces Studv. prepared under 
contract for the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1981.
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